ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING MORALE ABOARD SHIP

JAMES LYON GARTNER, JR.

ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING MORALE ABOARD SHIP

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Public Administration

By

James Lyon Gartner, Jr., B.S.

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Approved by:

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Adviser

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

The increasing emphasis on the personnel function in management is of great importance to the military as well as the civilian administrator. In recognition of this importance the Navy Department sponsors graduate study at selected universities for officers desiring to further their background for duty in the field of personnel administration and training. Selection for and completion of this study does not indicate that an officer will continue to specialize in personnel work for the remainder of his service career. He may anticipate assignment to the Bureau of Naval Personnel and to the larger activities in a staff capacity from time to time, but his primary classification is not changed: he may expect to remain fully eligible for promotion and command responsibilities within that classification. His concern with personnel will be for the most part that of the line administrator rather than that of the staff advisor. As a line administrator a naval officer will be affecting the morale of his organization with his almost every decision. Therefore an academic probe into the field of personnel

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administration is of great value to the line officer as well as to the officer designated a personnel specialist.

Morale affects performance. Therefore, a systematic study of conditions affecting morale, and use of personnel techniques derived from scientific study, should benefit the service in the long run. Any planned effort should prove better than hunch and improvisation.

Aboard ship, as elsewhere, morale is not static. It is affected from above and below, from within and without the organization. Of the innumerable factors affecting morale, this paper will be concerned with those factors within the control of the shipboard administrator. While it is not intended to establish a dichotomy of "politician-administrator", directives and policies from higher authority will not be subjected to critical scrutiny or analysis. For example, the morale changes effected by the rapid postwar demobilization were largely beyond the control of the shipboard officer, although his awareness and use of administrative techniques and methods available to him could alleviate the situation. It is recognized that matters of policy at one level of command may be looked upon as matters of administration by those at other levels. In the above example, the shipboard administration of demobilization would involve many decisions on the part of the commander that would appear as policy to those subject to his command.

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As morale is not static, it may be thought of as constantly improving and declining, as being an operationally defined concept rather than a definite action or series of actions. The level of morale varies with conditions and within the group. So as morale exists in varying degrees of excellence, it is quite proper to question fluctuations of morale within an organization without placing a stigma on those responsible--morale cannot be unvaryingly high.

Recognizing that morale problems do exist in the fleet, it is appropriate to examine the administrative factors affecting them which may be within the control of the shipboard administrator.[1] This examination will involve comparisons with similar factors found in non-military organizations as well as in academic studies of personnel administration and personnel management. It is fully realized that any one method or technique used in the administration of personnel could well be the subject of much writing and research. This paper will not attempt an exhaustive investigation of any one factor but will try to describe and evaluate certain major ones--those that are available to the average naval officer afloat not having special training in the field of per-

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CHAPTER II

MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS

Prior to approaching the administrative techniques and methods available to the naval officer afloat, this chapter will, in several short sections, consider miscellaneous matters held to be pertinent to the thesis.

1. Shipboard Organization

In order that further discussions on the functions of the shipboard administrator may be made more meaningful, a typical ship organization and the functions of the principal authorities will be presented. In the interests of simplicity, the organization of a destroyer will be considered in this section although the principles involved are common to all type vessels.[1] The larger types have additional departments depending upon the duties performed; the carrier, for example, has an air department not found on a tender, and the tender has a repair department not found on a destroyer.

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A ship is the responsibility of the commanding officer and his authority is commensurate; delegation of this authority to his subordinates in no way relieves him of his responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his entire command.[2] From this key position in the organization of any naval vessel, we may proceed to outline the basic organization of a destroyer. Figure 1 may be taken as representative of the departmental organization of a typical destroyer.



Figure 1.

Positions analogous to that of the executive officer are less commonly found in industrial and non-military organizations. In addition to the remarks pertaining to this position found in a following section, and in order that the functions of the executive officer may be better understood, the following responsibilities are abridged from naval regulations:[3] The commanding officer shall

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[2]U.S. Navy Department, Navy Regulations, (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1948), art. 0701.

[3]Ibid., 0703 and 0801-4.

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keep the executive officer informed of his policies and normally shall issue all orders relative to the duties of the command through that officer; all orders issued by the executive officer shall have the same force and effect as if issued by the commanding officer; the executive officer shall conform to the policy of the commanding officer and shall keep him informed of all significant matters; all communications of an official nature from a subordinate to the commanding officer shall be transmitted through the executive officer; the executive officer shall not normally exercise his authority in matters which are the specific responsibility of the heads of the various departments except to the extent necessary to secure uniformity and co-ordination of effort throughout the command; the executive officer shall recognize the right and duty of a head of a department to confer directly with the commanding officer on matters specifically relating to his department.

The department head is the representative of the commanding officer in all matters pertaining to his department, and he must conform to the policies and orders of the commanding officer. Similarly, each department head has his division officers with their subordinate divisions.[4]

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Taking the operations department as an example, it may be broken down into its typical component divisions as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2.

Thus the operations officer is the commander of the operations department, the sonar officer of the enlisted sonarmen, and each senior petty officer of his assigned men. Down to the lowest seaman, each man has his chain of command through which he receives his orders and through which he is ultimately responsible to the commanding officer.

The administrative organization has been briefly outlined; specialized relationships will not be developed, such as exist between the electronics officer who, under the engineering officer, is responsible for repair of radio equipment and the communications officer who, under the operations officer, is responsible for operation of this equipment. Nor will other internal organizations, such as watch and battle organizations, of primarily

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operative nature be developed, although the principles of responsibility and chain of command apply in these instances.

2. Morale Defined

Definitions of morale are found in many writings on and in the social sciences. From the psychologist's viewpoint, morale may be considered to be a state of mind evidenced by group solidarity and willingness to submerge individual interests in the group welfare.[5] The student of industrial relations may consider morale to be the mental attitude of employees, including the executive group, which makes them willing, and with initiative, to follow their leaders and to subordinate temporarily their personal aims for their ultimate gain through the success of the company.[6] The political scientist may define morale as " . . . a state of mind in which men and women voluntarily seek to develop and apply their full powers to the task on which they are engaged by reason of the intellectual or moral satisfaction which they derive from their own self-realization, their achievements in their chosen field, and their pride in the ser-

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[5]D.M. Johnson, Essentials of Psychology, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 467.

[6]M.J. Jucius, Personnel Management, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1948), p. 289.

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[5] D.M. Johnson, Essentials of Psychology, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 457.

[6] M.J. Dooley, Personnel Management, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1949), p. 333.

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While other definitions could be mentioned, the three given above serve to indicate how the subject is approached according to the interests of the writer; leaders in other fields might define morale differently. The point of major agreement is that morale is a state of mind and therefore not directly measurable. It is reflected, however, in the attitudes and actions of the members of an organization.

> It has been said that morale is a lot of little things. Probably nothing comes closer to describing accurately this important factor, because everything that makes a man feel well and satisfied builds up his morale, and everything that bothers him as an individual can lower his morale.[8]

The objectives of an organization should be considered before attempting a definition of its morale. If the objective of the armed forces is considered to be the extension of the national will by force, then it may be well to expand a definition of military morale to include the competitive will to win, beyond the point needed, for example, by organizations such as the Post Office Department. For the purposes of this paper, Professor White's definition, as quoted above, will be used with the addition of a conviction of excellence and a will to win on the part

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[7]L.D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1949), p. 471.

[8]U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), p. 232.

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[7] L.D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 421.

[8] U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1940), p. 238.

of the group as necessary elements to distinguish military from civilian morale.

> Military service is our most ancient public institution . . . In the history of the world, no free people has ever existed without it . . . Far from being a characteristic of imperialism, military service is the very cornerstone of the structure of democracy. Where the liberties of the people are the greatest responsibility of the government, there must be people trained and ready to defend these liberties.[9]

The significance of high military morale will not be belabored other than to mention that when the nation depends upon its armed forces for its survival nothing short of the highest morale is acceptable. High morale is indispensable to a successful fighting group. While negative instances will not be cited here, an outstanding positive one, the U. S. Marine Corps with its famed esprit de corps, is well known.

3. Leadership

This section will consider the concept of leadership as cutting across all activities and all levels in the service, as being not an affecting factor, but rather an essential determiner of morale. Some hold that:

> The single most important factor in the attainment of high morale is the quality of leadership exercised by the commanding officer. Expert leadership and high morale are inseparable.[10]

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[9] Ibid., p. 108.

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The significance of leadership in the maintenance of high morale is unquestionably great. This is clearly stated by White:

> The life and spirit of an organization do not spring from its structure. Quality depends on the motivations that energize . . . . These are derived in large measure from the character of leadership. Dynamic leadership is reflected in the drive and esprit de corps of the organization; and conversely any group that suffers long periods of uninspired direction is certain to run down--not only physically but spiritually.
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> Good organization facilitates good leadership but is no more a substitute for it than is a fully equipped company of soldiers a substitute for its commanding officer. Indeed, technically sound structural design may be reduced to "sheer ornament" by numerous variables, including especially this essential element of direction.
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> In the dynamics of management, leadership is vital . . . . In a large organization the potential capacity for leadership within the never-ending stream of new entrants is considerable. One of the major responsibilities of top management is to take steps to renew itself, indeed to lift its quality to constantly higher levels.[11]

The traditional ship organization, giving the commanding officer great responsibility and authority, offers excellent opportunity for demonstration of leadership. Unlike most non-military organizations, subordinate officers and men as well as the top executive aboard ship are rotated among naval commands frequently: two years in one position is the average tour of duty. As an individual

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The Psychology of Military Leadership, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943), p. 255.

[11] White, op. cit., p. 185 and p. 196.

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[1] Quoted, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 105 and p. 111.

<u>The Psychology of Military Leadership</u>, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943), p. 152.

is promoted he may anticipate assignments to positions of greater responsibility with greater opportunities for exercise of leadership qualities. This practice serves the purpose, among others, of increasing the chances that each member of the service will hold positions of higher leadership. Those making poor records for themselves as leaders are less likely to be selected for promotion and top positions. Thus the practices of forced leadership and forced attrition tend to eliminate the unfit. In this manner the Navy Department recognizes the importance of leadership to the service and to its morale. An officer may be an excellent technician, but without a record as a successful leader his chances of selection for top responsibility are slim indeed.

The traditional ship organization further recognizes the need of leadership by establishing the position of executive officer, under the commanding officer, senior to all others within the command. This officer is second in command, has no departmental duties, and is eligible to command if the commanding officer is unable to carry out his duties. In effect, a trained and qualified relief for the commanding officer is readily available. Positive provision for prompt replacement of the top leader is thus incorporated in the standard ship organization.

Leadership at the top, however, is not sufficient to

maintain a high state of morale throughout the ship. For the commanding officer, if he is not to rely solely on fear or intimidation to compel the organization's efforts, must operate through the morale generated by leadership among his subordinates as well as by his leadership directly; it is of the essence of good leadership that it inspire both loyalty and leadership in others. This leadership must be divided and subdivided until every member of his command is effectively tied into the operation; the petty officer as well as the admiral must be a leader.[12]

As students of industrial relations, Pigors and Myers write:[13]

> The successful administrator gets people to work with him, not primarily because he has power over them and can order them about, but because he is the kind of leader for whom they want to do their best.
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> . . . all the technical competence in the world will not suffice if his subordinates are working against him or grudgingly for him rather than enthusiastically with him.

While this statement applies more to civilian industry than to the administration of a military organization where performance is required by law, it does contain a suggestion to the naval officer. Rules and regulations often support administrators who operate through force and disci-

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[12] Ordway Tead, The Art of Leadership, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 14.

[13] Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), pp. 5-6.

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Another student of industrial relations believes the basic efforts for which labor is paid are time spent, energy--physical, mental, and emotional--spent, and the willingness to cooperate.[14] From the naval point of view, a federal contract or commission will specify the first, and a system of discipline will enforce the first and second, but the third basic effort cannot be prescribed by law. It is the ability to develop this willingness to cooperate (or morale) that marks the successful leader.

It is not the purpose of this section to describe the ingredients of a leader. But in the belief that, contrary to the old saying, leaders can be made as well as born, recent findings in the field will be reviewed. This is

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[14]Jucius, op. cit., p. 364.

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[14]Moore, op. cit., p. 264.

done to highlight the statement that something can always be done to improve morale, that any person may become a more effective leader who so sincerely desires.

Stogdill,[15] working under the sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research, made a thorough review of all the researches upon the personal qualities of leaders. He found "a preponderance of evidence from a wide variety of studies which indicates that patterns of leadership traits differ with the situation," and concluded:

> The total weight of evidence presented in this group of studies suggests that if there are general traits which characterize leaders, the patterns of such traits are likely to vary with the leadership requirements of different situations.

The leader can then best control his behavior so as to have the most desirable effects on his group, not by cultivating specific traits--a dubious accomplishment--but by learning to diagnose the situation in which he finds himself and by doing those things that are most sensible and most effective in that situation.[16] The aspiring leader can take comfort from this: few if any are born leaders in all situations, and changing situations are likely to present opportunities sooner or later for many types of men.

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[15] R.M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1948, 25, 35-71.

[16] Naval Leadership, op. cit., p. 182.

done to highlight the statement that something can always be done to improve morale, that any person may become a more effective leader who so sincerely desires.

Stogdill,[15] working under the sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research, made a thorough review of all the researches upon the personal qualities of leaders. He found "a preponderance of evidence from a wide variety of studies which indicates that patterns of leadership traits differ with the situation," and concluded:

> The total weight of evidence presented in this group of studies suggests that if there are general traits which characterize leaders, the patterns of such traits are likely to vary with the leadership requirements of different situations.

The leader can then best control his behavior so as to have the most desirable effects on his group, not by cultivating specific traits--a dubious accomplishment--but by learning to diagnose the situation in which he finds himself and by doing those things that are most sensible and most effective in that situation.[16] The aspiring leader can take comfort from this: few if any are born leaders in all situations, and changing situations are likely to present opportunities sooner or later for many types of men.

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[15] R. M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Psychology, 1948, 25, 35-71.

[16] Naval Leadership, op. cit., p. 120.

4. Responsibility and Authority

This section is introduced to emphasize the duty and obligation of the leader--to stress the necessity of planned action, as opposed to unsystematic functioning and inertia--in carrying out any program, such as one to build morale.

In naming some of the attributes of responsible men, Graham writes:

> Discretion is essential to responsibility, which is something more than enforceable accountability. A duty that contains no element of initiative, judgment, or choice for the one obliged to perform it may be a matter of accountability, but not of responsibility in the wider sense . . . .
>
> A second characteristic of responsible men is recognition of an obligation to meet a need that exceeds the individual's and to act according to a standard that is outside himself and beyond his control . . . .
>
> A third characteristic of responsible men is regard for the consequences . . . .
>
> Responsibility connotes a certain amount of rationalism and an element of prudence. A responsible leader may endanger his own life or the lives of his followers, but he will only do it for a considered reason, after some weighing of the objectives and some calculation of the risks. It is this element of responsibility in leadership that holds a group together . . . .
>
> . . . A responsible administrator does not imperil the vitality of his organization.[17]

This discussion of the essentials of responsibility is in accord with responsibility as delegated by naval

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[17] G.A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility", in F.M. Marx, ed., Elements of Public Administration, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), pp. 502-3.

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[1] A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos of Public Administration, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), pp. 202-3.

directives and regulations; the elements of initiative and judgment are frequently stressed to the naval officer by his superiors. And regardless of how much he may feel denied the right to exercise his own ideas and methods, the responsible administrator will take full advantage of his faculties of initiative and judgment in performing his duties within the prescribed limits. To do less would be the exercise of mere "enforceable accountability", not a desirable practice on the part of one handling men.

In his discussion of the search for principles in administration, White suggests that allocation of authority be in clear and concise terms, and that authority must be commensurate with responsibility.[18] While the directives under which the shipboard administrator operates are exhaustive in definition of both his responsibilities and his authority, "few public officials would agree that they ever possessed authority equal to their responsibility, even in the merely legal sense of the term; and if authority means the capacity to take action fully equal to the occasion, they would properly assert that it rarely exists".[19] This again emphasizes the need of initiative and judgment in accomplishing results within the structure and procedure specified by law.

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[18]White, op. cit., p. 38.

[19]Loc. cit.

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[18]White, op. cit., p. 89.

[19]Loc. cit.

Aboard ship the greatest part of planning for high morale will be done by those responsible for the execution of the plans. While outside assistance from higher commands, with their extensive staffs, may be available, in the day-to-day administration of personnel affairs the commanding officer and his subordinates are relatively free in this respect. If an inspecting senior finds an excessive delay in the trying of minor offenders, for example, the commanding officer will be called upon to explain why adequate plans were not made to permit prompt scheduling of hearings. Such administrative planning is normally the responsibility of the commanding officer, and nothing other than extremely abnormal circumstances or operations will remove the responsibility from him.

From the plans of the Navy Department, the major fleet and type commanders prepare and distribute proposed employment schedules as far as practicable in advance of the actual ordering of ship movements and activities. The commanding officer is therefore able to forecast with a certain degree of accuracy the time he will have available for administrative as well as operating duties. When on extended maneuvers, less time will usually be available to spend on personnel problems than when alongside a tender or in a shipyard for repairs.

The legal requirements connected with personnel records, court-martial procedure, and similar routine ad-

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The legal requirements connected with personnel records, court-martial procedure, and similar routine ad-

ministrative duties are very explicit, but other factors that play a large part in a plan to build morale such as counseling, welfare, and positive motivation are not firmed for unplanned execution. It is here that the responsibility of the naval officer for planning is left in large measure to his own discretion. "Planning, in the context of administration, begins where general policy stops; it is concerned with the means by which ends can be brought to fruition."[20] As the policy of the Navy Department is to expect high morale, it is up to the commanding officer to plan a program and see that it is placed into effect, that the desired end of high morale aboard his ship be attained.

". . . (Program planning) begins with the detailed study of the job to be done, leading to the identification of the principal parts and their divisions . . . the relation between them . . . and the types of procedures that will be required."[21] This is the task of the commanding officer, as the responsible officer, aided by his subordinates.

The execution of an over-all plan to maintain high morale aboard a ship will require many decisions on the part of the commanding officer. In order that major doubts

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[20] White, op. cit., p. 201.

[21] Ibid., p. 205.

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The responsible commanding officer, head of the unit will be required,"[82] that is the task of the commanding officer . . . and the types of procedures the relation between them . . . fication of the personal parts the basic divisions . . . tailed study of the job to be done, leading to the identi- . . . (Program planning) begins with the de- placed into effect, that the desired end of high morale should not be attained.

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[82]Ibid., p. 205.

[83]Wolfe, op. cit., p. 218.

and possible sources of misunderstanding may be avoided, the commanding officer may issue statements of policy. A ship policy promulgated by the commanding officer and conforming to policies of senior commands may be used to prevent ambiguity, to specify ways and means, and to assign priority to functions to be performed.

One concluding comment on responsibility is that initiative is displayed by one who has the energy and ability to undertake a new enterprise without outside direction. The exercise of initiative presupposes (1) one's having sufficient knowledge of the problem to know what should be done, and (2) one's loyalty--that such action will not be initiated that is not in accordance with the plan and policy of superiors.[22]

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[22] Naval Leadership, op. cit., p. 204.

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CHAPTER III

CIVIL-MILITARY CONTRASTS

> In some companies, management has acquired its competence in the school of hard knocks. In others, personal experience has been supplanted and expanded by recourse to accumulated knowledge, current practices of others, and research.[1]

Just as the industrial personnel manager looks at the current practices of other organizations, it is well for the military administrator to be aware of practices in the civilian administration of personnel.

Further, to understand problems and conditions peculiar to the shipboard administration of personnel it is helpful to contrast naval with civilian practices. This is appropriate, as methods available to develop high morale differ with the organization. For example, selection and remuneration are major tools of a factory manager but not of the officer afloat, and the self-contained system of naval justice differs greatly from procedures used in industry to enforce discipline, and so affect morale.

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In this chapter, sections will be devoted to areas where major differences in administrative practices affecting morale occur between shipboard and other organizations. By pertinent contrasts, morale problems may be made more meaningful.

1. Selection and Placement

It has been said in connection with the organization of a personnel department in business, that "The primary function of the personnel department is to employ qualified workers in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of the business enterprise and to participate in all activities that will tend to keep the employee a satisfied cooperative and productive worker."[2] The importance of selection and placement is thus recognized to be fundamental. Subsequent functions are dependent upon the quantity and quality of the force employed; poor practices at this initial stage can produce severe financial losses to the concern. It has been found profitable by many companies to invest considerable sums of money in programs of research, testing, interviewing, and examining in order that the organization will be staffed by personnel in correct numbers and with the desired attributes to en-

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sure successful operation.

In the Navy, the functions of recruitment and assignment to duty have been removed from the shipboard administrator. A commanding officer no longer has the authority to effect first enlistments aboard his ship, and a radioman upon arrival at a ship will not find himself assigned to duty in the engineroom. The extensive facilities of the naval recruiting service and the training commands ashore assume the functions necessary to pick and train the force needed to run a modern vessel with its complex equipment. When an officer or man is ordered to report to a command, his commanding officer may assume that he is qualified for the duties of his rank or rate; he will not have to proceed with the screening of a series of applicants for the billet to be filled.

A large measure of judgment is frequently needed to correctly place untrained individuals in the shipboard organization, as in the case of apprentice seamen not selected for specialized training upon completion of recruit training. And it is considered good practice to rotate junior officers with no experience at sea among the various departments. However the selection and placement problems of the shipboard administrator are far fewer than those of the industrial personnel manager.

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The benefits gained by being relieved of these problems are contrasted with the resultant inability to con-

trol the quantity or quality of the personnel assigned to a command. General economic and political conditions control in large part the recruitment program. Remuneration is fixed by law, and in times of prosperity a commanding officer may not advertise for radio operators at the prevailing wage rate, nor may he refuse to accept a draft of thirty seamen he may not need at a particular time. He must at all times do the best he can with what he is given in the way of manpower. If his leading radioman is ordered to another ship or station and a qualified relief is not aboard, that does not prevent the loss of the key man. So it is seen that at times the benefits of the support of specialized establishments ashore are reduced by the accompanying loss of control.

Placement of military personnel may be contrasted with that of civil service employees. In the former less attention is placed on the job to be done; a naval officer may be transferred from the position of gunnery officer of a cruiser to that of commanding officer of a destroyer, for example, or to any position within wide limits. Mobility and variety of experience is demanded. Civil service position-classification, on the other hand, is based on the job to be done; the applicant must have qualifications specified for the position.

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> that (1) the same requirements as to education, experience, knowledge, and ability may be demanded of incumbents, (2) the same test of fitness may be used to choose qualified applicants, and (3) the same schedule of compensation is made to apply with equity under the same or substantially the same employment conditions.[3]

The naval enlisted personnel structure is more like the civil service classification than is the naval officer structure which permits but a limited percent of the total officer strength to be classified as specialists. Thus while a gunners mate will normally be concerned with some phase of gunnery and will advance in that rating branch, an officer may be assigned a specific billet for which he has had no previous training and/or experience. With the increased complexity of naval operations and functions, however, there is a tendency to increase the specified qualifications for larger numbers of positions, but not to the extent seen in the federal civil service.

2. Promotion and Remuneration[4]

While many industrial concerns have overemphasized the role played by wages in maintaining harmonious labor relations, as has been demonstrated by research similar to that conducted by the Western Electric group, it is

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[3]L.D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1949), p. 372.

[4]Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), Chapters 16 and 17, passim.

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[4] Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), Chapters 11 and 17, passim.

reasonable to state that without a fair wage policy and consistent internal wage relationships, the personnel program will be faced with insurmountable difficulties. And a good promotion policy requires that earnings on each job be related to the value of the job.

The skilled industrial personnel administrator will be required to continuously evaluate the positions within his company, its payment plans and methods, and the individuals employed. Competition for the best labor available and pressure from unions will require long-range plans in this respect. Large staffs are employed to conduct this work at no small expense.

But for the outlay of this money, the enterprise has purchased a powerful tool--the personnel department may play a vital part in the development of good morale through wise use of remuneration of employees. Wage payment may be based on time or output, and each method may be used under different circumstances to better advantage than the other; employee attitude must be weighed along with other considerations in arriving at a decision regarding which method will prove most effective. Common employee attitudes found regarding wage payment plans are that they are too complicated and that standards are set unfairly. Worker morale will obviously be benefited if these feelings are removed from the minds of those concerned, and, further, it can be definitely raised by intelligent use of an ap-

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propriate incentive plan. Over-all production and morale have been increased in many instances by application of a well-planned group incentive type of wage payment.

Other payments, such as bonuses, pensions, and profit-sharing, may be effectively utilized by the industrial personnel administrator to effect good morale.

These factors discussed briefly above are not available, however, to the shipboard administrator; military pay is determined by Congress. To compute the total service pay of anyone in the Navy is simple: in most cases one need only to know the rank or rate, years of service, number of dependents, and type of duty. The commanding officer may not effect promotions except in a very few cases. Neither may he raise the salary of a subordinate; fines may be awarded in some instances as punishment--a negative incentive. Thus the positive financial incentive is available to the commanding officer only indirectly: his reports of fitness may affect future promotion of a subordinate or determine that a recipient of increased pay for hazardous duty is no longer qualified for it.

In the Federal civil service, the classification and years service determine the pay of the worker. Associated classes are grouped into series and services to relate them and establish lines of promotion. Selection for promotion is normally made by the head of the agency concerned, aided by factors such as promotional examinations, efficiency

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rating and seniority. To a larger extent than is seen in military service, this gives the administrator a control over the subordinate. While provisions are made for review and appeal of decisions, as well as transfer, it appears safe to say that the civil service administrator has more direct control of subordinate promotion than does the naval administrator.

During the last war, the Navy employed the so-called spot promotion in many cases where the incumbent officer was assuming the responsibilities of the billet of a more senior officer. And to meet the conditions imposed by a tight labor market at that time, the civil service found it expedient to up-grade many positions. These practices are not, however, normally available to the government administrator, and may not be counted upon as techniques to raise morale in routine personnel administration.

Promotion and remuneration in cases of government employees has long been subject to some form of central control, and private employees are finding themselves more and more subject to a similar control as a result of legislation and agency decree in recent years. The Wagner, Taft-Hartley, and similar acts illustrate this trend.

3. Legal Enforcement of Discipline

In this section, the term discipline will be used as meaning a system of control gained by potential or actual

reting and monopoly. To a larger extent than is seen in military service, this gives the administrator a control over the manipulants. While provisions are made for review and appeal of decisions, as well as tenure, it appears safe to say that the civil service administrator has more direct control of subordinate promotion than does the naval administrator.

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Despite our reluctance to depend on government employees for control, there has been a steady decrease in the number of positions subject to some form of control, and private employment has diminished somewhat as a result of legislation and executive order. The latter control as a result of legislation and executive order. The latter control has given the administrator a control over the [illegible] and dismissal [illegible] tenure.

[illegible] Civil service [illegible]

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punishment for disobedience. In this sense a contrast may be drawn between the legal methods of insuring compliance in military and non-military administration of personnel. It is recognized that, in the broad sense, discipline is far more than the phase under present consideration. The way discipline is enforced has a marked effect on morale, obviously.

Workers in modern industry, due largely to their unionization, do not find themselves as helpless before their employers as they once were. Legislation now gives protection to the industrial worker, and prevents practices such as arbitrary fines or discharges from being imposed by management. Union contracts specify in great detail the rights of all parties, and personnel managers are unwilling to sponsor or tolerate abuse of these rights. Provision is made through grievance machinery to hear and act on employee's dissatisfaction with the company, and the company has procedures to follow in the case of dissatisfaction with the employee. While penalties vary with different companies, they should be applied fairly and in the same way all the time for fear of losing the confidence of the employees or having some outside agency criticize the company and its management.[5]

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[5]Jucius, op. cit., Chapter XXII.

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[3] Yoder, op. cit., Chapter XXI.

capacity, and attention to duty are questions of discretion and judgment to be determined by the head of his department.

> . . . (The United States Civil Service Commission) is vested with authority to investigate only when it is alleged that the procedure required by law or rule has not been followed, that unequal penalties have been imposed for like offenses, or that political or religious discrimination has been exercised. The Commission has no general jurisdiction to investigate the sufficiency of the reasons for a removal, which are finally determined by the appointing officer.
> . . . The widespread impression that a merit system employee cannot be effectively disciplined or removed is without foundation in the national service as in most other jurisdictions. If discipline is lax and if incompetent employees are not removed, the fault lies with the responsible officials in the department, not with the protected status of the workers.[6]

White distinguishes between the informal and the formal types of discipline and mentions the fact that disciplinary actions may take one of many forms without resort to any legally established procedure. The reason he gives for this system of control is that many offenses are too slight, or too subtle, or too difficult to prove, to warrant direct and formal action.[7] Informal disciplinary measures are probably seen less in industries where a highly active and aggressive union is constantly on the alert. Informal

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[6]White, op. cit., p. 426.

[7]Ibid., p. 423.

capacity, and attention to duty are questions of discretion and judgment to be determined by the head of his department.

> . . . (The United States Civil Service Commission) is vested with authority to investigate only when it is alleged that the procedure required by law or rule has not been followed, that unequal penalties have been imposed for like offenses, or that political or religious discrimination has been exercised. The Commission has no general jurisdiction to investigate the sufficiency of the reasons for a removal, which are finally determined by the appointing officer.
>
> . . . The widespread impression that a merit system employee cannot be effectively discharged or removed is without foundation in the actions or records in most other jurisdictions. It discipline is fair and it improvement employees are not removed, the result is the responsible officials in the department, not with the protected status of the workers.[6]

While distinguishing between the informal and the formal type of disciplinary action, outline the fact that disciplinary actions may take one of many forms without regard to any legally established procedure. The reason be given for this system of control is that many offenses are too slight, or too difficult to prove, to warrant direct and formal action.[7] Informal disciplinary measures are probably more [illegible] where a highly active and aggressive union is constantly on the alert. Informal

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[6] White, op. cit., p. 126.

[7] Ibid., p. 23.

measures and subtle forms of discipline may make their influence felt without requiring overt action or attracting attention, however, and the shrewd administrator will take note of their possibilities.

Disciplinary powers granted the naval commanding officer are far greater than those of the non-military administrator. While the cruel and unusual punishments have long been abolished in the service, the comparatively independent structure of military justice leaves much to the discretion of responsible officers. The authority to convene courts-martial is granted the commanding officer; the sentence that may be awarded is subject to mitigation or remission by the convening authority, his immediate superior in command, the Navy Department, and on up. While the sentences a military court may award are limited by law, different grades of courts are authorized to award greater or lesser degrees of punishment, and the discretion in the severity of sentence possible is in the hands of the officer convening the court. Another factor that enhances the power of the commanding officer is that he normally appoints the members of the court from among those under his command.

Considerable authority, in a legal sense, is needed by a naval commanding officer because of several factors not frequently found in non-military organizations, among them the hazardous objectives of the group, frequent

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Considerable authority, in a legal sense, is needed by a naval commanding officer because of several factors not frequently found in non-military organizations, namely, the American objectives of the navy, "readiness"

isolation, and continuing existence in comparatively close quarters.

> Two chief differences between Navy and civilian job performance are (1) the living and working together in close quarters aboard ship and (2) the added stress placed upon Navy personnel by participation in combat. Because of these two factors, supervising officers in the Navy place considerable emphasis upon such personal qualities as ability to get along with others, faithfulness, dependability, willingness to take orders, and interest in the job.[8]

That these qualities are stressed is seen in a list of offenses punishable by courtmartial. While sleeping on duty could result, at most, in discharge of an industrial worker, it could result in a sentence of death in the case of a serviceman. The fact that, in times of emergency, conscription must be resorted to to build a fighting force implies that legal, as opposed to voluntary, means of compelling obedience will continue to be essential, regardless of the great progress being made in the handling of human beings.

4. Measurement of Morale

In industry it has been said that if greater economy and effectiveness can be obtained through the contributions of a high morale, then it is important from the managerial

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[8] D.B. Stuit, ed., Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1947), p. 380.

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[2] C. C. Pratt, ed., Personnel Psychology and Job Evaluation, Volume II: Personnel Programs and Job Evaluation in the Armed Forces (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 200.

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> There is probably no phase of the industrial program in which there is more "wishful thinking" than that indulged in by managers as to the attitudes of their employees toward their company.[9]

The industrial manager has several techniques at his disposal, many of which are relatively new and still in the process of development. The techniques used in industry are of two general classes: the first is an analysis and interpretation of objective data, and the second is more subjective. Labor turnover, absenteeism, production and waste are indices of morale, in many cases, although of different factors in others; the analysis of such data "at best is difficult and is not always reliable as an index of morale."[10]

One objective index of employee morale that has been developed in connection with safety programs is the analysis of industrial accidents. A spirit of teamwork, manifested in safety-mindedness for others, was found to be a significant factor in accident reduction.

> Accidents can never be altogether eliminated, because human beings will never become entirely stable and perfectly efficient. But, when the

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> accidents that do happen are used as educational material for employees (both management and workers) at all levels, there can be a progressive gain in morale and teamwork. Unless accidents are so used, they not only indicate lapses in morale and teamwork but also are apt to set up a vicious cycle in which the feelings of workers suffer further depression that cumulatively reduces their efficiency of action.[11]

Aboard ship, as in industry, accident frequency may be used as an index of morale, and for the same reasons as stated above. Other indices of an objective nature that may be found useful by the shipboard administrator include cases reported by the sickbay, requests for transfer from the command, reports involving insubordination, fighting, theft, and the like. In statistics that reveal instances of lack of teamwork, indices of morale may be found. Their analysis and evaluation, however, must be done skillfully and thoughtfully by an experienced officer to arrive at valid conclusions concerning the state of morale at any given time.

The subjective class of morale-measuring techniques includes the following methods with accompanying comments:[12]

> Supervisors Impressions.--Many executives are inspirational leaders and capable of developing morale, but few even of these are trained in observing and evaluating morale standards. Executives should be encouraged to strive to sense the morale situation and should be aided

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[11] Pigors and Myers, op. cit., p. 94.

[12] Ibid., pp. 508-511.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 300-311.

[2] Tiffin and Myers, op. cit., p. 64.

in this attempt by more accurate information than their impressions.

"Listening-in" Process.--There is no place in this type of attitude measurement for persons with pronounced biases. It is difficult to secure individuals who possess the required scientific approach to do this work. As a whole, this type of discovering the morale status of employees is not satisfactory.

The Unguided Interview.--This method not only provides a means of interpreting morale but at the same time is used to build morale. Its effectiveness is dependent upon the effectiveness of the interviewers.

The Guided Interview.--The interviewer seeks to direct the interview in such a manner as to secure the answers that will reveal the desired information. The success of this method, like the unguided interview, is largely dependent upon the skill of the interviewer in soliciting answers and his objectivity in evaluating the results of the interview.

The Questionnaire Technique.--The simple technique of asking a question and having the employee answer it has the advantage of not suggesting any particular answer to the employee, but it is difficult to evaluate, and many employees have difficulty in expressing themselves on paper. The multiple-choice questions permit considerable shading of meaning when carefully constructed, are much quicker to answer, and are readily measurable by statistical methods.

Due to the nature of military service, attitude surveys are not conducted as they are in industry to determine such variables as wage-payment methods, hours and conditions of work, and the like. Naval surveys of opinion and attitude are rare and do not directly determine future action. In reporting work carried on in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, three major opinion surveys, begun in

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1945, are described with the accompanying remark that they "represent only a very modest attempt to probe the complex area of attitude and morale."[13]

In 1949 a survey was conducted among representative groups of officers to determine their views toward continuing with a naval career. Such a study, upon careful analysis, could well be considered to be an index of officer morale. The Bureau has not released the results of this study.

> During the war a large number of morale studies were made by the Army and a few by the Navy. These studies indicate . . . the morale factors generally effective in the services . . . .[14]

Many results of the Army studies are reported in the American Soldier series.[15] The Navy studies made to de-

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[13] D.B. Stuit, ed., Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 410. Described are: (1) a survey of Navy training--what enlisted men thought about their training, (2) a survey of educational services--to reveal participation in and value of the educational services program and resulting information and attitudes about the war and the future, and (3) an attitude survey of Amphibious Force personnel--to reveal opinions about that branch of naval service.

[14] Ibid., p. 449. As a matter of interest, the eight morale factors found were (1) satisfaction with the job, (2) belief in the mission, (3) a realistic appraisal of the job ahead, (4) confidence in the training and equipment, (5) pride in one's unit or organization, (6) belief that one's individual welfare was a matter of concern, (7) relations between officers and enlisted men, and (8) faith in the cause and in the future.

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> When adequate attention is given to these basic problems of suitability and interpretation, in addition, of course, to the technical research problems, opinion studies can provide valuable and useful evaluative data for personnel and training programs.

Thus while research is being conducted at higher levels in the Navy on attitude surveys, the questionnaire technique is, for practicable purposes, not of use in the measurement of morale aboard ship today. Such matters as welfare and recreation are at times determined by popular opinion--whether to use welfare fund monies for baseball uniforms or a dance, for example, should, in most cases, be determined by those for whom the fund exists, the crew. Such a decision would likely be made by them through their representatives, however, and not as a result of a referendum.

Therefore, aboard ship, the impressions made on those responsible are the most widely used measurements of morale,[17] and a deeper understanding should be obtained by the use of the interview, the subject of another chapter.

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CHAPTER IV

MORALE REQUIREMENTS

The psychological needs that the members of an organization must satisfy in order to be happy and productive may be titled and stressed differently by different students of the subject. In their discussion on the basic emotional needs, Mosher, Kingsley, and Stahl[1] state they are a sense of security, a sense of success (achievement and recognition), and a sense of belongingness. They stress security as being the broadest and most basic need, in some ways comprehending the others. Other writers refer to these concepts by other names and with varying degrees of importance.

In this chapter the topic of fundamental requirements of morale will be considered under three section headings--objectives, recognition, and security. This arrangement is made in accordance with the biases of the writer, and is not submitted as the ultimate classification. "Morale is not a summation of effects from different sources but a characteristic of the whole indi-

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[1] T. Hoober, J. C. Kingsley, and [illegible]. Stahl, Office Personnel Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. [illegible].

vidual and the whole group."[2] Thus it is impossible to isolate and treat individually any morale requirement discussed in this chapter.

The reason for including in this thesis a chapter on the fundamental morale requirements has been well stated:

> The alternative to giving serious attention to the fundamental psychological needs of human beings is generally destructive of all that we are seeking when we bring people to work together in a common enterprise.[3]

It is held that the fundamental morale requirements, by whatever names one chooses to call them, should be well known to all holding positions of personnel responsibility. They should guide all administrative actions affecting morale.

1. Objectives

Knowledge of objectives may be considered to be a very important factor affecting morale, and one that is too often neglected aboard ship. Without certain goals, an individual or a group may not be expected to perform at a high level of efficiency or to enjoy the satisfactions of knowledge that a job has been well done. Without a feeling of achievement, it is not reasonable to

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[2]David Krech and R.S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 412.

[3]Mosher, Kingsley, and Stahl, op. cit., p. 291.

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expect any satisfaction, any sense of worth-whileness on the part of a person or a group. High morale is thus automatically excluded by failure to insure that all hands have their goals. Depending on the capacity or intelligence of those under consideration, the wise administrator, regardless of his rank or position, will make it a point to see that goals of some type are always in sight. Persons of higher intelligence, having capacity for abstract thought, will not require the simple and immediate goals of their less developed team-mates. While it may be sufficient for a skipper to tell his executive officer of many years experience that every effort should be made to win a gunnery competition, it may be that a seaman newly reported aboard should have the importance of cleaning a gun mount prior to the exercise explained to him. In this case the complexity of scoring a target practice is well known to the responsible officer, but the new man must be told of the importance to the safety of the entire vessel of the gun's perfect functioning. Here the man's immediate objective is the simple preparation of the mount for firing, not the accompanying calculations, procedures, operations and decisions that he would not comprehend. And if his gun is inspected and found ready to fire on schedule, the seaman has done his part; he may experience the same feeling of accomplishment, realizing the importance of his work, as do his superiors after a suc-

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cessful exercise. If the seaman's petty officer had directed the work to be done "because I said so", no objective would have been presented to the mount cleaner and, while the work might have been done, no feeling of importance would make the task appear worthwhile--hence, no feeling of achievement.

> In the absence of clear over-all objectives, groups cannot hope to achieve a high order of synthesis and will easily deteriorate. One of the most serious morale problems of men in the military forces during the war was the non-existence for large numbers of them of any clear-cut goal for which the war was being fought.[4]

While the average naval officer is probably not sufficiently trained to adequately interpret and explain national policy to the satisfaction of all his subordinates, he should make every effort to insure that his own directives are known and understood, that the objectives he sets are comprehensible. This establishing of subgoals will in many cases act as a step in improving over-all morale.

It is realized that it is not always possible, or even desirable, to explain fully what is to happen and why. In many cases security prevents disclosure of plans; in others failure to appreciate large objectives prevents opening of dependent plans to scrutiny. But if at all

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[4]Tyson and Cruickfield, op. cit., p. 406.

possible, all hands, within the scope of their ability to comprehend, should be kept informed. This applies equally to the procedures to be followed as well as to the actual operations to be performed; the structure of the organization should be known, and the seemingly reasonless lines of responsibility explained--a gunners mate should know why he is assigned to a battery under the direction of an assistant engineering officer for one drill and why he reports to the chief quartermaster for another.

It would be enlightening to conduct a survey aboard almost any vessel to determine to what extent all hands know why they do what they do, and to determine how far down the chain of command reasons for decisions and actions are made known. It seems safe to state that a large share of the complement of any ship remains uninformed in many areas that superiors assume are well known to all. While much information is passed along lines of informal organization, the morale-conscious administrator will insure that what he wants known is actually known, and that his subordinates keep in mind the very real importance of knowledge of objectives. In many cases, the establishment of sub-goals will help maintain interest if the ultimate goal is distant or incomprehensible. This is illustrated by the practice of holding weekly inspections for which all hands may prepare rather than explaining that the objective or goal is a sanitary ship's company, a safe

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vessel, or something equally intangible. At weekly inspections, defects that may be corrected within a reasonable time are pointed out, and vague directives, such as one to "clean up the ship", are not required.

A correlary of this tenet is that lack of objectives or setting unrealizable objectives may easily lead to frustration and personal disintegration. Hounding a subordinate to "clean up the ship" without giving an indication of what constitutes a clean ship may lead to undesirable results, obviously. But many administrators fail to realize the benefits to morale that may be obtained by setting realistic, obtainable goals, aimed at the level of those under consideration, the realization of which adds to the feeling of achievement of those held responsible for their accomplishment.

Krech and Crutchfield in discussing the significance of positive goals state that it is also necessary to have some feeling of moving toward the goal and that "very small amounts of encouragement and success and small steps toward the goal are frequently effective in sustaining and enhancing motivation."[5] This fact should be kept in mind when objectives are first established to prevent setting goals that may not be obtained within reasonable time or that are so distant no progress may be detected en route.

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> Whenever group members can see or believe they can see evidence of advance toward the group objective, morale is thereby likely to be strengthened. The converse is also true. Just as "nothing succeeds like success", so "nothing fails like failure."[6]

This same reasoning may be applied to the individual as well as to the group, and it is an appropriate concept with which to begin consideration of the next morale requirement.

2. Recognition

When one makes progress toward an individual or personal goal, recognition of this achievement may likely come from within and is less dependent on recognition from without; when one advances toward a group objective, recognition by that group is more often demanded. Gunner Jones may collect and study stamps, for example, for his own satisfaction without expecting compliments from his shipmates, but when he works to get his equipment ready for the big competition he wants the gunnery officer to be aware of his contribution and he wants his importance to be known by the command.

This need for recognition is an important factor affecting morale. The need for commendation when due is not limited to any rank, rating group, age, or other classifi-

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cation--it is inherent in the human being. The simple act of calling his subordinates by their names helps to show that an officer recognizes them as individuals and that their performance is not being accredited to an unidentified "you, there". Division officers and the senior petty officers should be required to keep the performance of their subordinates under surveillance close enough to insure that individual effort, or lack of effort, is noted. Telling a working party that an assigned job has been done only fairly well works a hardship on the man that put forth a sincere effort and similarly lets the group laggard know he would be foolish to contribute more. The responsible supervisor should be in a position to tell Johnson before the group that he had done an excellent job and Jackson privately that he should take steps to carry his share of the load.

Commendable acts, if of sufficient importance, should be brought to the attention of all hands. In this connection, it is wise to provide many areas in which individuals may excel. While everyone may not be the best boxer or most alert radar operator aboard ship, competition in many fields and among the divisions may be arranged so as to enable the greatest number of individuals to attain some measure of personal recognition from their shipmates.

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of anonymity to over 11,000 enlisted separatees of every rate and rating in every major separation activity within the continental United States in the period between January and April 1948. These data were analyzed by E. C. Asman[7] to compare the morale of various sub-groups, broken down on the basis of duty assignment. By taking reenlistment as a criterion, most of the men would be considered to have very low morale: they gave the Navy a try and for one reason or another decided against it. Their responses to several questions give weight to the importance of recognition of the individual and the awarding of credit where due. To the question "Do you think your officers were interested in what you think and how you feel about things?" 47% said that few showed interest and that they were pretty much indifferent, and 24% said they ignored or rode rough-shod over the men's feelings. And to the question "Do you think your officers generally gave you credit for the work you did?" 16% replied they knew they didn't, 19% replied the officers did not know one way or another, and 18% replied they received credit only when their work was not satisfactory.

Commander Asman concludes (in part):

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[7]E.C. Asman, A Study of Some of the Factors Affecting the Morale of Separatees from the United States Navy, (unpublished thesis, The Ohio State University, 1950).

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> The conclusion that the type of leadership these men have experienced was not of the highest order is inescapable. Although there were some differences between the groups in their attitudes in this field of relationships with superiors, by far the greatest percentage of all groups felt they were not recognized as individuals, did not receive credit for achievement and did not get fair and helpful supervision.
>
> It is significant that these men were not so much concerned about the physical environment inherent in the different branches of the Navy, as they were about their relations with their superiors or the various administrative practices which affected them. For it is in the area of superior-subordinate relations that the greatest opportunity exists for the improvement of morale regardless of the branch of service involved.[8]

This conclusion is one in which the writer fully concurs.

3. Security

The third major morale requirement to be considered in this chapter is that of security. The assurance of fair and equal treatment is of great importance in promoting a feeling of security in an individual or a group. This is well illustrated in the above mentioned study where 57% of the separatees questioned gave their impression of Navy justice and discipline as being unfair or inconsistent, whether hard or soft. In this connection, a sound principle in personnel management effectively

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stressed by Jucius[9] is to add to fairness the appearance of fairness; be fair, but also appear to be fair. In the belief that the majority of naval officers desire to administer justice even-handedly, it may be that the unfavorable responses to the last question were occasioned by the fact that the important element of appearing fair was absent in the cases of many of the separatees. The important objective of a feeling of security remains, however, and every effort should be made to make subordinates feel that they are to receive just and equitable treatment.

During the war a group of naval aviation cadets taking flight training were asked in anonymous interviews what their present work efficiency was, considering their most efficient past work as being 100%. The average cadet was found to be performing at around 65%. As these men were anxious to get their wings, why were they performing at an average of 35% below their peak? Intensive interviewing suggested two related negative factors: (1) the pervasive fear of failure, and (2) a fear of unfair evaluation of work.[10]

In such a situation, real efficiency is highly un-

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[9]M.J. Jucius, Personnel Management, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1948), p. 40.

[10]U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), pp. 47-8.

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[10] Mrs. [illegible] Kelly, "Psychology in Flight Training," Naval Aviation Medical Center, Pensacola, Florida: Naval Medical Institute, 1946), p. 4-5.

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[10b] Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1946), p. 4-6.

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In this situation it is easily seen that fear (of failure and of unfair evaluation) operated to produce a feeling of insecurity with accompanying reduced performance.

Another aspect of security is a type of stability. While military activity is not the most predictable there is, morale may be seriously affected by incomprehensible changes. This concept allies itself closely with the ones previously discussed, the importance of knowledge of objectives and the reasons why performance is required. It may be extended, however, to include the desirability of letting subordinates know as far in advance as practicable of proposed alterations to an established routine. Accordingly, it would be poor practice to give a man two hours to pack and catch a train for a training school when his orders have been aboard ship for a week. Similarly, scheduled activities should be carried out as announced. If the crew has worked to prepare for an inspection, it should not be cancelled at the last minute because it may

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be inconvenient to the skipper.

In connection with this discussion of security and stability, the following has been said about industrial unrest:

> Industrial unrest manifests itself in a more or less continuing state of uncertainty, uneasiness, and aimless activity arising out of unaccounted-for fears or unsatisfied longings.
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> To seek something better is not to be frowned upon either on the part of individuals or on the part of groups. Wise leaders recognize that change is a requisite of progress. The attitudes of people differ markedly with reference to change. Some persons are constitutionally opposed to change. They desire security even on a low level if necessary and look upon change as endangering their security. Other people seem to be constitutionally eager for the new and untried. Radical change is difficult for the masses to adjust to even though they may have advocated it at the time of its initiation. Gradual change is more in keeping with man's natural temperament.[12]

Taking this lesson from industry, the shipboard administrator would do well to seriously consider the possible effects of proposed actions that may be thought to be radically out of line with established precedent. This takes us back to the initial consideration of the importance of keeping all hands informed of "why". All the requirements discussed in this chapter are highly interrelated, and all should be kept in mind in personnel administration.

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[12] W.D. Scott, R.C. Clothier, S.B. Mathewson, and W.R. Spriegel, Personnel Management, (3rd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941), pp. 433-4.

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CHAPTER V

INCENTIVES AND MOTIVATION

If it were possible for a skipper to hand pick his crew, he would choose those whom he knew were well adjusted and highly motivated toward the service and its objectives. Unfortunately, this cannot be done, and the best must be made with the manpower assigned.

> Many military groups are forced groups, but this does not mean they cannot become effective groups. If group membership is psychologically rewarding, officers and men will identify with it, will work for this group and not merely for personal advancement or for purposes of keeping their professional consciences clear. But where the group is forced, identification with it or morale in it cannot be expected, to happen automatically. Some military organizations never do become real groups . . . . Most military outfits, though initially forced, do become real and effective groups.[1]

The problem becomes one of making the individuals want to become effective. In this chapter considerations will be made of providing incentives and motivating personnel toward a state of high morale. In addition to positive and negative incentives, sections will be devoted to two typical situations--indoctrination of new

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[1]U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1940), p. 165.

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MORALITY AND MOTIVATION

If it were possible for a skipper to hand pick his crew, he would choose those whom he knew were well motivated and highly motivated toward the service and its objectives. Unfortunately, this cannot be done, and the best must be made with the manpower available.

Many military groups are formed primarily for the purpose of keeping their professional competence at a high level. But where the group is formed, identification with it, will work for this group and not merely for personal advancement or for purely logically toward it, officers and men will [illegible] objectives. If group membership is psychologically rewarding, but this does not mean they cannot become ob-

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The problem becomes one of leading the individuals to become real and effective [illegible]. Most military outfits, though initially formed, to become automatically. Some military [illegible] before to become real [illegible] . . . . [illegible] vital. It is unwise to [illegible] this [illegible] to become effective. In this case [illegible] will be made of [illegible] incentives and [illegible] [illegible] toward a state of high morale. In all [illegible] [illegible] motivation [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

men and the correction of past mistakes.

1. Positive Incentives

The specific positive incentives available to the shipboard administrator are, for the most part, applications of the fundamental morale requirements discussed in the preceding chapter. In applying those principles, he is aided by the traditions and prestige of the Naval service developed over many years and providing for a continuity of purpose and method. Upon joining the service, the individual finds himself identified with a new group.

> Equally important with the various cognitive and motivational factors affecting morale . . . are those factors of an emotional sort having to do with feelings of group solidarity, identification, involvement, and the like. These emotional factors are inseparable, of course, from all the other morale determinants.
>
> It can be expected that, other things being equal, the more closely the individual members identify themselves with the group the higher the morale of the group will be.[2]

Recognizing this fact, over the years the military has made the group distinctive, psychologically and physically. Aside from its objectives, it is made distinctive by the use of formal leadership, organization, uniform, ceremony, symbols, and the like, that set

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definite boundaries between the members and the non-members. The natural desire on the part of an individual for group approval and recognition may thus be exploited by the military administrator as a positive incentive.

Commander Harlow writes:

> Therefore, although you cannot neglect such institutional factors as the Navy's traditional prestige, ceremonies, and other formalities, you should remember that they are psychological tools and not objectives.
> To every leadership problem you meet, you can, while following the prescribed "Navy way", still apply the personal methods of persuasion and dominance. It is only in this manner that you can influence your men to bring to their tasks the enthusiasm and the extra ounce of spontaneous effort that so often spell the difference between failure and success for the whole command.[3]

Another consideration in the application of basic morale-determining principles is that participation of the individual in group activities is essential.

> Requiring the individual to assume responsibilities ensures that he will feel more deeply involved and identified than if he is permitted to exist passively in the group.
> . . . group identification can be enhanced by involving the individual in the group in as many different aspects of his personality as possible.[4]

Thus, the positive incentives that the shipboard administrator may use are numberless: all applications of principles that recognize fundamental morale requirements.

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[3]A.M. Harlow, "A New Look at Naval Leadership", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 76 (Nov. 1950), p. 1203.

[4]Krech and Crutchfield, op. cit., p. 415.

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Thus, the positive incentive of the disciplined military unit may be maintained [illegible]

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Knowledge of one's mission, one's progress, one's status, assurance of fair treatment and opportunity, a feeling of group solidarity and individual dignity are all vital to good morale. There is no need to pile up evidence to prove that the value contributed to morale by U.S.O. shows and the like is at best questionable; the end results accomplished by military organizations do not correlate with entertainment and beer,[5] but rather with the application of principles basic to the successful handling of men.

2. Negative Incentives

Negative incentives, as well as positive incentives, are frequently misunderstood, both as to their reason for being and their effectiveness. Fear of a loss is substituted for desire for a gain when negative incentives are employed. The loss may be at many levels: prestige, personal freedom, status, financial, privileges, life itself. In considering the administration of negative incentives, it is well to keep in mind that it often is the certainty of the loss rather than its severity that is greater in deterring the undesired behavior. Threatening to award a severe punishment to those caught in a misdeed will not have the

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[5]The writer found very amusing a national advertisement sponsored by the United States Brewers Foundation in April, 1951, supporting the statement that in time of emergency beer is essential to public morale.

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[5] See Walter Reuther's testimony before Senate Committee sponsored by the United States Veterans Foundation in April, 1951, supporting the statement that it "has of course been essential to public morale."

desired result of preventing the misdeed if the odds are poor that one would be caught.

To be effective, the loss must be a real one. Certain punishments may be thought by seniors to be severe (and therefore effective) while in eyes of the guilty one and his group no loss has occured, and, in fact, the "punishment" might result in a higher status for the miscreant. Getting away with inadequate punishment can be as exhilarating as getting away with forbidden behavior; either can serve to make a man a hero to his group. Over a period of time this competition with authority can do great damage to morale. Great care must be taken in the administration of negative incentives to insure that this competition does not mushroom, especially along lines of informal organization. A high state of morale, which implies cooperation with authority, will generally be reached where negative discipline is kept at a minimum; the use of positive incentives is greatly preferable to the use of those that result in personal or group losses. But as this is not always possible, a few remarks will be made on the administration of punishment.

The Navy Inspector General[6] stressed the harm that is done to morale and discipline by the use on the part of

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[6]Admiral Newlett Thebaud, in a speech to the Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy, January 19, 1947.

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As was brought out in the Aswan study, punishment should be fair and just; this means that it should be administered impartially and impersonally. One should be made to feel that punishment is coming from the Navy and not from an individual, either the commanding officer or his representative. This means the elimination of any feelings of personal dislike, anger, prejudice, and the like. It further means that punishment administered should be forgotten; personal feelings are likely to develop if one is constantly reminded of his correction.

> Punishment to be most effective should be inflicted as soon as possible after the offense has been proved. Delay may easily lessen its value as a corrective measure.[7]

Punishment cannot rectify a mistake once made. Fear of punishment may prevent a mistake; it is a tool, and it should not be used otherwise--constant threatening does not serve to build confidence in the organization and in the justness of superiors. Every person in authority

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[7]U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1943), p. 243.

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[7] U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Leadership, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1944), p. 242.

should make certain he does not foster fear of punishment merely to enhance his own prestige; such action may easily have results opposite to those desired.

One line of reasoning tending to prove the greater effectiveness of positive over negative incentives is that the former develop feelings of group accomplishment and pride in the organization. This pride causes individuals to avoid bringing discredit on the organization, and this same pride causes the group to police itself in large measure thereby avoiding many disciplinary problems. Fear of group disapproval may act to deter behavior where fear of individual loss, after consideration of the risks of being caught, may not. In any case positive incentives add to morale while negative ones can at best maintain it.

3. Indoctrination

So far this discussion of motivation has been fairly general. The actual application of fundamental morale determinants and incentives will vary from situation to situation and from ship to ship depending on circumstances and the personalities of the responsible administrators. As an example, the problem of indoctrination of newly arrived men aboard ship may be handled in several ways. This section will consider this problem as typical of the many that occur in the fleet; it would be impossible to consider

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3. Indeterminacies

So far this discussion of motivation has been fairly general. The actual application of fundamental morale determinants and incentives will vary from situation to situation and from shop to shop depending on circumstances and the personalities of the responsible administrators. As an example, the problem of introduction of newly arrived men should only be handled in several ways. The section will consider this problem as typical of the many that occur in the field; it would be impossible to consider

them all. One other problem, that of correcting past mistakes resulting in a state of low morale, will be considered in the next section.

When a man reports to a new command, it is desirable for him to become an efficient team-mate as soon as possible. He is no different, basically, from the rest of the crew; he has the same needs and his differences from the existing group of men are of degree rather than of kind. With men of long naval service, the integration with the crew should not be too long a process; with inexperienced youngsters, the program should be more carefully planned; and recognition of individual differences should be made in all cases. Many vessels have found it of value to have written procedures to be followed in the indoctrination of new men. Large drafts of men are frequently received aboard with little or no advance notice. At these times an advance plan or procedure is of great benefit.

Recognizing the importance of knowledge of objectives, the new man, during his indoctrination, should learn the objectives of his ship, its characteristics, and what its mission is. He should learn the objectives of his department and the gang to which he is assigned. The exhausting work of periodically servicing a torpedo becomes more reasonable when one understands the importance of this servicing to the proper functioning of the torpedo and the

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Recognizing the importance of knowledge of objectives, the new man, during his indoctrination, should learn the objectives of his ship, its characteristics, and what its mission is. He should learn the objectives of his department and the part it will be in meeting them. The orientation work of periodically assisting a torpedo becomes more reasonable when one understands the importance of this servicing to the proper functioning of the torpedo and the

successful completion of one of a destroyer's missions.

Provision should be made for the recognition of the new man as an individual. One plan is for a responsible petty officer, chosen for his interest, to take a small group around, showing them their compartments, introducing them to the group with which they will be assigned, and generally displaying an interest in their getting settled. If a new man has a family, and if circumstances permit, to grant reasonable liberty to get them settled in a strange city will go a long way to getting him off to a good start--it is widely recognized that a new arrival is of little value and fails to learn if serious domestic problems are on his mind. Such recognition of individual needs makes for a frame of mind receptive to his new assignment. The interest of the command in the individual, of which these examples are but a few of many, prepares the way for interest of the individual in the command. The reverse also holds: it is improbable that a man will show interest in the command if none is shown him. With small initial effort, a sound basis for future relations may be established from the beginning. If the new man has an outstanding record from his last duty station, it will not hurt to let him know it has followed him. And if he has a name, it should be learned and used.

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> A friendly welcome to the organization is not the only purpose of good induction, however. An equally important objective is to give the new employee accurate and useful information about the company, the employee services it offers, and the personnel policies that will affect him as well as all other employees.
>
> Experience with well-planned employee-induction programs in industry, in government, and in the armed services is so favorable in terms of subsequent employee satisfaction and performance that no organization, except possibly a very small one, can afford to omit this procedure from its personnel program.[8]

Security in the new man should be developed as soon as possible. Knowing where he fits in the organization and what the organization expects of him is of great importance. The indoctrination of the new man aboard ship should include an explanation of the ship's organization, ship's orders and policies, procedures he should know, and who the key individuals are that he will have dealings with. It is one thing to tell a man that the paymaster takes care of all pay records and another to take him to the supply office and tell him that Lt. Smith will be glad to see him at 1030 any weekday to register an allotment to his dependents. The less the new arrival feels he is at the mercy of a disinterested "system" the greater will be his sense of security. The whole indoctrination program should be aimed at giving the new man

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[8]Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 160.

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Chief Clerk and "A" Squad, Bureau of Identification, New York City Police Department, 1947, p. 175.

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4. Correcting Past Mistakes

The second problem to be considered in connection with the shipboard application of principles of morale is that of correcting mistakes made in the past that have resulted in an organization's having a low morale. This can be either the entire command or any segment thereof. In any case, it is well to attempt to discover where and why morale is poor. In this connection, in industry it has been found that:

> An analysis of the morale of various groups may reveal wholly unexpected results. For instance, the rank-and-file workers may score higher than the minor executives, a condition that may indicate to top management that they have taken too much for granted in connection with their treatment of these minor executives. Employees of from 5 to 10 years' service may show a lower morale score than shorter service employees. Older employees with the same length of service as younger employees often show a higher morale score than the younger employees. These results are not easily explained. However, a determination of the facts may lead to further investigation as to causes that will lead to corrective measures either in initial employment and training or in the handling of long-service employees.[9]

While this method of locating poor morale may hold aboard ship, it is more probable that the grouping will be

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[9]Scott, Clothier, Mathewson, and Spriegel, op. cit., p. 513.

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by departments or gangs rather than an over-all age division. If this proves to be so, the individual in charge of the dissatisfied group should be evaluated in the light of what basic principles he is failing to apply.

And as to determining <u>why</u> morale is poor, in industry it has been found that:

> Employee-attitude studies provide one of the most valuable methods of determining the current status of personnel relations. These studies may reveal that supervision is satisfactory but working conditions are not in keeping with the employees' desires, that wages are satisfactory but that supervision is entirely inadequate, that the training program is not meeting the requirements of the employees, that promotions in the eyes of the employees are not being made on merit, or many other aspects of personnel management that are vital to effective operation of the enterprise.
>
> Management as a rule is desirous of doing the right thing for its employees but is often baffled to know what is the right thing to do and what the employees' reactions are to what is being done.[10]

As discussed in the previous chapter, shipboard measurement of morale does not take advantage, as does industry, of formal attitude studies. However to determine reasons for poor morale, some measure of attitudes must be made: one cannot correct a situation when the reasons for that situation are not known. Responsible seniors should make their estimates of attitudes as accurate as possible by studying methods of interviewing and by training to observe reflections of morale. For example,

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[10] <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 515-6.

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one should recognize insubordination as an index of morale, and one should, through formal or informal interviews, be able to strike at the roots or reasons for this misconduct. This should be done not merely to punish the offender but to enable the causes to be identified and eliminated.

The actual rebuilding of a high state of morale consists of applying basic principles. The following discussion will illustrate how over a period of about two years morale of a naval air station was raised from a discouraging low to a very high state.[11] The principles used are considered to be valid afloat or ashore. The command in question was charged with training enlisted aviation ratings. When the activity was reactivated after several years in a stand-by status, the morale was poor. The problem was approached and solved through the enlisted instructors attached to the command. Formerly they had been berthing and messing alongside the trainees; they were given barracks and mess halls of their own. Formerly their hours of instruction were unbalanced and unequal; the teaching load was distributed, each instructor taught a maximum of six hours a day and was assured of two hours

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free, those periods following a pre-planned schedule. The instructors were given authority commensurate with their responsibilities, they were awarded extra privileges and incentives, and their individual achievements were recognized. For outstanding work or new ideas, the enlisted instructors had their accomplishments published and accredited to them by name and rate. Thus pride and appreciation of the importance of the duties of the rate as well as of the individual was acknowledged; photographs and articles in publications distributed service-wide carried greater prestige than just in a paper published for the command, although the station paper was developed into an excellent one.

The morale of the students was improved by the new attitudes of their instructors. The instructors were in the class to help; the school was vocational, and scholarship for its own sake was not the goal. The enlisted instructors could speak on the level of the students, yet there was no frivolity and the instructors required respect. All hands were impressed with the fact that claims were to be backed up: if the men were promised something, they could expect to get it.

Advisory boards were established to counsel and advise men on academic, personal, financial and other problems. This service, while voluntary, became popular when the sin-

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cere interest of the boards in the men had been demonstrated.

Service facilities were expanded. Each man upon reporting for duty receives a packet containing instructions, information on housing, maps of the area, and tips on what to do with their family, prices, points of interest, recreation, and the like. The process of checking in was simplified and localized; in the past it had required traveling 23 miles to complete. On departure, the checking out process was cut to 1-1½ days.

Clubs for the recreation of chief petty officers and petty officers are cared for by their members; they offer excellent entertainment and recreation features. Other activities include clubs for conducting almost any hobby, a garage where the men may buy parts at cost and repair their automobiles with tools provided, musical and dramatic groups, and the like. In all instances, the success of the recreation program is due to active participation. This is held to be an element vital to the success of similar programs, regardless of the size of the organization, ashore or afloat.

When this command was reactivated, the grounds and buildings were badly run-down. Realizing that the physical appearance of the plant affects morale, a long-range plan of beautifying the station was put into effect. Personnel

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By making instructing carry more prestige, the duty has become more desirable--many instructors return again for duty at this station at their own request. Relations between the naval personnel, the civilian employees and the townspeople are excellent. The command conducted a campaign in the local papers to effect this cordial situation. Articles aimed at educating the townspeople carried messages such as those that reminded them that the sailor is their neighbor's boy, that he probably misses his own home, and what are they doing about it? This campaign has been highly successful, with many servicemen finding social outlets in the city's homes, canteens, clubs and churches.

From the above example, it should be clear that morale can be improved, no matter how badly it may appear to have slipped. Considerable ingenuity is often required, however, in applying morale-building principles. One device found helpful is the use of so-called "morale-carriers", those individuals respected by their fellows and commanding more-than-average attention in the informal organization. By convincing them of the honest interest and intentions of their superiors, they may carry or convey this interest to members of the command who for one reason or another

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cannot be reached directly. The element of rapport is of great importance in exchanging views, ideas and desires--it is impossible to talk with a person who will not listen. To achieve cooperation, communication is essential; this may be accomplished in many instances by dealing with the influential, the respected, and the interested members of the command.

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CHAPTER VI

INTERVIEWING

Communication is essential in directing human activity. A serious conversation directed to a purpose other than satisfaction in the conversation itself is an interview; it includes facial expression, gestures, inflection, and other means of face-to-face communication as well as spoken words: they all contribute to the purposeful exchange of information which is the interview.[1] Some activities demand greater experience and expertness in interviewing than others; some professions--law, medicine, social and psychological investigation, to name a few--have developed effective techniques to accomplish their ends. A knowledge of the problems and procedures of these experts is of great help to the administrator upon whose handling of men the morale of his organization may depend.

The nature of the interview varies with the use to which it is to be put; these uses have been reduced fundamentally to three: fact finding, informing, and motivating.[2] In other

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[1]Walter Bingham and B.V. Moore, How to Interview, (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 1.

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[1] Walter Dill Scott and J. A. Moore, How to Interview (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931), p. xv.

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words, a person is interviewed in order to learn something from him, to tell him something, or to influence his feelings or his behavior.

Aspects of the first two uses of the interview that are of value to the naval officer will be considered in this chapter. The following chapter on counseling will consider pertinent aspects of the second and third fundamental uses of the interview.

The objective of the interview should, first of all be clear in the mind of the interviewer. It has been the experience of the writer that formality is not a necessary ingredient to the success of an interview; the establishment of rapport is of greater importance, whether the objective of the interview is to determine knowledge about specific events or an interviewee's own attitudes and feelings.

1. Interviewing to Determine Facts[3]

The interview technique to determine facts should be used with caution and discriminatingly; if more reliable sources, such as documents or actual observation of situations, are available, the interview is usually un-

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The interview may be a useful tool with relation to psychopathology:

> The officer will not be called upon, of course, to diagnose or treat any extremely deviant behavior. But he should be able to recognize abnormal behavior when it occurs in his unit. Since the abnormal is almost always merely an extreme form of the normal, the study of everyday behavior should aid in recognizing the serious departures from the normal.
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> To understand and control human behavior, either normal or abnormal, we need to deal with it on the level of causal dynamics rather than in terms of superficial common sense.[4]

The interview is a valuable technique for studying human nature as it may be directed to the discovery of what lies behind behavior.

As the interview to determine facts is only loosely connected to the topic of this thesis, this subject will not be developed beyond the above comments. Reference was made to an outstanding work in this field. The importance to morale of accurate fact-finding and investigating, as in misconduct reports and charges of neglect of duty, is, nevertheless, great, and not to be underestimated by reason of the brevity of this section.

2. Interviewing to Determine Attitudes

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Chapter III contrasted the use of attitude studies in industry and in the naval service. In the Navy, the poll has never been appreciably used, either to directly determine action or to measure morale. Thus a study of the personal interview, as used to throw light on attitudes, to measure them, and to alter them, may prove of value to the fleet.

Personal interviews have been used in industry to accomplish the threefold purpose of supplying management with information regarding conditions and attitudes, releasing the will to work among employees and supervisors interviewed, and building up a supply of valuable case material to be brought to the attention of supervisors and executives.[5]

> As a means of achieving insight, interviewing is an essential device for diagnosing organizational stability . . . .[6]

Similar benefits may be obtained by the shipboard administrator, without lessening the prestige of military command or risking accusation of conducting a "popularity poll", an obstacle to the use of attitude surveys. Benefits of intelligent interviewing could accrue to all con-

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[5]Bingham and Moore, op. cit., ch. 9, "Interviewing Workers about Employer-Employee Relationships."

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[6]Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 80.

cerned; it is unnecessary to document the statement that failure to communicate easily leads to misunderstanding and conditions unfavorable to good morale. It is not an indication of lack of leadership or failure to command for one in a position of responsibility to consult with subordinates; this is recognized by the great majority of military administrators. However to increase the effectiveness of such communications by the practice of proved interview techniques is an objective, the accomplishment of which warrants study by those who interview. Hit-or-miss methods may be replaced by those found to be more scientific. The techniques of the interview need not be saved for special or formal occasions; they should be an integral part of day-to-day functions. The skilled administrator will have rapport with his subordinates developed in order that they will not worry "what did I do wrong now?" every time they are summoned for a consultation. He will have them accustomed to the situation of the interview in order that the required communications may be made quickly and effectively.

This requirement of rapport, a harmonious relationship, could theoretically extend through the chain of command. It is not to be expected that all seamen would feel at ease talking to an admiral face-to-face, but, and again theoretically, he should be able to talk to him through intermediate authorities. Human nature, however, insures the odds that

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somewhere along the line the communication will be broken.

In discussing one rule of interviewing industrial workers, Roethlisberger and Dickson write:

> The interviewer should do everything to help the worker feel at ease. There are many different ways of accomplishing this end. . . . The worker is likely to be resentful of any display of authority, or of any indication of his social subordination. The interviewer, therefore, should guard himself against displaying authority in any of its forms. He should not give any orders to the interviewee, and, of course, he should never violate any confidence given to him. He should also avoid the more subtle forms of displaying authority, such as contradicting the worker, interrupting him, taking the role of the teacher, or treating his ideas lightly.[7]

The conductors of this research program found it necessary to obtain their interviewers from persons not in the hierarchy of authority in order to achieve the rapport needed to reveal the desired data, the feelings of the workers. Therefore, the military chain of command, possibly more so than the industrial, due to the great significance placed on rank and authority, should not be relied upon for a free flow of expressions of feelings and attitudes. Human proclivity to respect rank, one's apprehension of authority, prevents it.

This being the case, that a responsible administrator may not rely upon his immediate subordinates to relay the

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[7]F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 288. This work is an account of a personnel research program conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works.

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sentiments of those below, how is he to obtain a picture of what they are thinking? Several possibilities present themselves. Arbitrarily discarding the attitude survey technique as being *non grata* in contemporary military circles, these possibilities involve the planned interview.

First, to parallel the Hawthorne method, trained interviewers from without the command, having no military authority and identifying no individual, could be employed. This would, in the opinion of the writer, be a hard program to sell individual commanding officers, responsible officers who are by training jealous of their prerogatives and position, and officers without whose support the program could hardly succeed.

Second, some officers have personalities such that it is easy for them individually and successfully to contact members of their command at all levels in the chain. They are dependent on no one for measures of morale; they are also few in number.

Third, the training of all officers could include study of interviewing techniques and supervised practice to develop the ability to establish rapport that all do not inherently possess. Such a program, if successful, could establish the chain of command as the communication line of feelings upward as well as the line that distributes orders

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downward.

The following conclusions of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Men's Relationships, headed by General Doolittle, which held hearings in the spring of 1946, represent a considerable departure from traditional military thought but are considered appropriate to this discussion on communication.

> The causes of poor relationships between commissioned officers and enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:
> a. Undeniably poor leadership on the part of a small percentage of those in positions of responsibility;
> b. A system that permits and encourages a wide official and social gap between commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.[8]

The gap between senior and subordinate, the distance across which it is necessary to communicate, can be narrowed by better techniques of communication. It is obvious that official rank, hence gap, is necessary in a military organization just as it is in business or elsewhere. And no culture is without its groups, hence gaps. Abuses should be corrected, however, and to this end the Doolittle Board recommended (in part):

> That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each (officer) candidate . . . receive much more comprehensive instruction in command responsibilities, personnel management,

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[8]Quoted in Samuel A. Stouffer, et al, The American Soldier. Vol. II: Combat and Its Aftermath, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 379.

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and human relations.[9]

This third possible method for keeping responsible officers informed on matters of attitude and feelings--morale--is held to be the most sound. As a military unit or organization, a naval vessel is self-sufficient as far as possible. Therefore it is not tenable to rely on outside experts to investigate and report findings of their interviews. And that too few officers can, without training, establish effective contact and communicate with their subordinates is supported by the Doolittle Board findings.

Training of all officers in human relations is a desirable goal, but until such time as it is accomplished, hit-or-miss techniques will continue to prevail.

While it is not the purpose of this chapter to tell how to interview or to analyze the techniques, the following considerations are held to be pertinent:

> In the interview I use a number of simple rules or ideas. I listen. I do not interrupt. I refrain from making moral judgments about the opinions expressed. I do not express my own opinions, beliefs, or sentiments. I avoid argument at all costs. I do this by seeing to it that the speaker's sentiments do not react on my own.[10]

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[9] Ibid., p. 330.

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> Personal interviewing is not only the task of the personnel specialist but of everyone with supervisory and executive responsibility. Rightly done . . . it forestalls irritations, disarms hostility, makes friends, and releases the will to work.
>
> The person who does the interviewing learns much about human nature . . . . The experience of interviewing thus constitutes a valuable feature for the training of supervisors and prospective supervisors.[11]

Also:

> The fact that is usually raises more questions than it answers is not wholly to the discredit of the interview.[12]

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[11] Bingham and Moore, op. cit., p. 160.

[12] Ibid., p. 145.

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CHAPTER VII

COUNSELING

Counseling attempts to bring about a constructive change of attitudes on the part of the counselee through individual, face-to-face contacts. This extension of the interview process deals with individuals who are maladjusted, perplexed, failing, delinquent, and the like. Its aim is to help these individuals leave their interviews somewhat better adjusted to their problems and facing realities of life more constructively.[1]

The previous chapter pointed out the real need for a program aimed at training administrators in the naval service to develop competency in interviewing. By extending this competency, some could become proficient in the field of counseling. Aboard ship, as elsewhere, effective counseling can contribute to group morale by helping better the adjustment of individuals, hence their behavior. As counseling is not conducted on a group basis, and as the process is a time-consuming one, its application would of

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necessity be limited. In this respect, consideration may well be given to treatment of the more influential persons who find themselves out of step with the organization. By helping them to regain a well-adjusted position, the morale of the group may be improved.

> Although most of the statements made about . . . counseling apply with equal force to any military organization, whether in training or in combat, there has been very little use of a counseling approach in the vast war program which has been inaugurated in this country. The failure to use such a tool is due in part, no doubt, to the usual cultural lag in translating new discoveries into effective working programs. It may also be caused in part by the tendency of the military mind to think in terms of a mass, rather than an individualized, approach. Yet there are many reasons to suppose that our growing knowledge of psychotherapy could be effectively used in the military program.[2]

Counseling has been used at naval shore establishments such as the Training Centers where recruits are helped to adjust to authority, new social groupings, and an uncertain future. It is used in the training of many military specialties, such as flying, diving, submarine service, and the like. And it is used, finally, in the readjustment of psychological casualties. But during the great majority of the time an individual is in the service, between his entrance and his exit, unless he is given training for extra-hazardous duty or sent to a hospital,

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he has little if any opportunity for receiving scientific counseling.

In the belief that a counseling program is valuable and worthwhile in the day-to-day life aboard ship, this chapter will summarize the old and the new viewpoints in counseling, the work that has been done in other forms of administration, industrial and government, and the benefits that have resulted.

1. The Old Viewpoints in Counseling[3]

Almost everyone who was ever placed in a position where advice was sought will recognize the continuing use of many of the old techniques and approaches presented in this section. They assume that the counselor is in a position of competency such that he is able to judge what the individual seeking help should do. One of the oldest is that of ordering and forbidding; this technique has been laid aside in modern psychotherapy, not because of its lack of humanitarian feeling, but because it has proved ineffective: it does not basically alter human behavior.

A second approach, now in disrepute, is that of exhortation; an individual was worked up to a point where

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he would promise to achieve some worthwhile goal and would thus supposedly bind himself with his good intentions. The most common sequel to this technique is a relapse; no real change is made.

A third approach is the use of suggestion, in the sense of reassurance and encouragement, in the hope that the motivation of the individual will be strengthened. But telling a counselee that he is getting better tends to deny the problem which exists, as well as the feelings of the individual toward his problem.

While these older methods are of historical interest to the trained counselor, they are in current use today by the well-meaning but uninformed person who may attempt to alter behavior or attitudes through the medium of counseling. Also in use are the techniques of giving advice and intellectual interpretation.

The practice of giving advice has two major weaknesses. The individual who has a good deal of independence tends to reject suggestions in order to retain his own integrity. And, on the other hand, the person who has little independence, who leans on others for decisions, is driven deeper into his dependency.

Intellectual interpretation relies on an explanation of the basic reasons for an individual's behavior to him, assuming that such explanation would result in changed at-

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2. A New Approach to Counseling

A newer psychotherapy has been described by Rogers and includes numerous ramifications, many of which are largely in a state of experiment and many of which are not considered to be appropriate to adaptation to shipboard use by non-medical personnel. Without quite extensive training, beyond that possible to give a non-specialist, many phases of this new therapy are out of the question. The basic characteristics of it, however, are of interest and warrant further study on part of those who counsel. It is granted that shipboard administrators who are placed in positions where counsel is sought should operate on a level commensurate with their training and experience, and they should not assume qualifications not held. A knowledge of the basic concepts of this new approach to counseling, however, cannot but help avoid many misconceptions on the

attitudes and behavior. It overlooks the fact that while the counselor's interpretation in a case may be quite correct, that does not make it any more acceptable to the individual concerned. Such explanation has value only to the extent that it is accepted and assimilated by the counselee; his behavior is not changed very effectively simply by giving him an intellectual picture of its patterning.

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subject, misconceptions that are currently widespread in the fleet where "giving advice" is a ready solution to anyone's problems.

The basic hypothesis, upon which Rogers bases his client-centered work, is briefly put as follows:

> Effective counseling consists of a definitely structured, permissive relationship which allows the client to gain an understanding of himself to a degree which enables him to take positive steps in the light of his new orientation.[4]

This approach relies heavily on the individual drive toward adjustment. Therapy here is not a matter of doing something to an individual, or of inducing him to do something about himself, as it is a matter of freeing him for normal development and of removing obstacles to this development. This approach places greater stress on the emotional aspects than upon the intellectual aspects of the situation. This recognizes that most maladjustments are not failures in knowing; the thief knows it is wrong and inadvisable to steal, but he frequently continues to do so because of the emotional satisfaction such acts provide. Further, this new approach places greater stress on the immediate situation than on the individual's past; Rogers feels that significant emotional patterns show up as well in present adjustment as in past history. A final

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characteristic of this new approach is that the interview itself, the relationship with the counselor, is a growth experience in itself; other approaches expect the individual to grow and change and make better decisions after the interview is over.[5]

This counseling relation in which the counselor does not decide, direct, or advise, but rather helps the individual think and decide for himself, requires a total lack of coercion. The adaptability of this method to shipboard use is questioned. For if the counselor should not make the decisions for the counselee, it is equally true that someone must do so if the individual is not able, intellectually and emotionally, to think for himself. Such is the case with many, both in and out of the service; the time required to bring such cases up to par by strictly non-directive methods would appear to be prohibitive.

The Army found that if the civilian worker's problem concerned his job primarily and he needed some facts to clarify his thinking, it was well to let him "sound off" his opinions for two reasons: "First, it lets the supervisor know how the employee feels about the situation, which is very important . . . . Second, it clears the air so that the employee can accept any objective informa-

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[5] Ibid. These main characteristics are abstracted from Ch. II.

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tion . . . without the mental resistance caused by unexpressed feelings about the matter."[6]

This may be practicable in civilian practice, but is hardly adaptable to the military--the process of "sounding off" is too prone to lead to a report of insubordination. Further:

> If the counselor possess formal authority, it would tend to weaken the supervisor-employee relationship because it would inevitably take from the supervisor some of his responsibilities in dealing with people. In the last analysis the supervisor is and must be responsible for the handling of his employees.[7]

This, to repeat, does not preclude the value to shipboard counselors of knowledge of the principles of this technique.

Cronbach writes:

> The client-centered point of view proposed by Rogers has been a controversial topic, but most counselors have found his suggestions acceptable and desirable at least in part.
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> Most counselors compromise with the nondirective approach to some degree because of administrative conditions or other reasons. Even where the approach is not purely nondirective, emphasizing the client's responsibility is a helpful technique.
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[6]Schuyler Haslett, The Supervisor's Job in Human Relations, (Kansas City Quartermaster Depot: Army Services Forces, 1945), p. 15.

[7]War Department, Employee Relations Officer's Guide, Effective Utilization of Manpower Series Manual No. 12, (December, 1943), Section IV, p. 3.

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> Prescriptive counselors usually organize their work to obtain as wide a variety of information about the client as possible, making a wise interpretation, and bring the client to base his action on this information. While they respect the right of the client to choose between alternatives of merit and do not force even a wise course of action upon him, their emphasis is on keeping the client from making errors.[8]

These comments have much to recommend them to naval personnel in counseling positions.

An outgrowth of the research done at the Hawthorne Works, counseling is an important phase of human relations. Its significance was highlighted by World War II; in 1945 there were estimated to be about 350 counseling positions in the Federal departmental service, comprising about 200,000 employees.[9] The techniques are not firmed, and much research is needed to perfect them. Roethlisberger and Dickson recognized that personnel counseling is not a cure-all and that it "is still an experiment and is not regarded as a panacea for all employee relations problems."[10]

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[8]Lee J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), ch. 16, "The Use of Test Results in Counseling".

[9]Reported in W.E. Mosher, J.D. Kingsley, and O.G. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 306.

[10]F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 604.

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An outgrowth of the research done at the Ohio State Institute of Human Relations, counseling is an important phase of human relations work, and Dickson recognized that personnel counseling is not a cure-all and that it "is still an experiment and is not regarded as a panacea for all employee relations problems."[10]

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[10] Dickson, W. J., "Counseling in an Industrial Organization," Personnel Journal, IV (1925), p. 116.

The work of Rogers and others in the field of counseling cannot, obviously, be reduced, here or elsewhere, to a handy series of rules or maxims. Concentrated work, study, and practice are needed to comprehend much of what is read. In the light of the needs of shipboard administrators in the areas of interviewing and counseling, much could be done to present the work of leaders in these fields to the service in a form that could be put to practical use.

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CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

The administrative action of evaluating performance of subordinates is common to industrial, military, governmental, practically all organizations of any appreciable size. Such determination of the value of an individual, having to do with how a job is done, as opposed to the job rating which has to do with what a job consists of, can be effective in promoting a healthy state of morale, as well as accomplishing other objectives. These objectives of personnel rating must be adapted to the ends desired of the evaluation program; they will be discussed in a section of this chapter. Further, techniques in use and in the research stage of development, both military and non-military, will be surveyed and contrasted. Finally, a section will be devoted to aspects significant to the evaluation of naval personnel aboard ship.

Problems of personnel rating are of long standing and great complexity. Much literature has accumulated on the subject, and considerable research is being conducted to develop better techniques. This chapter will be especially

CHAPTER XIII

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

concerned with evaluation as it affects morale.

1. Objectives of Personnel Evaluation

A program of evaluating individual performance, like other personnel tools, is not an end in itself, is not to be expected to function at a high level if not integrated with other tools, and must be designed and administered with the results that are desired in mind. The main reason for its being is to increase the economy and effectiveness with which an organization performs its functions. The specific objectives which may be accomplished by the evaluation of individual performance may be considered under four headings.[1]

First, to develop standards of satisfactory performance--delineating the quantity and quality of work that is adequate for the interests of the organization.

Second, to improve employee performance by identifying and measuring strong and weak points of individual performance, recording objectively these evaluations, giving encouragement to employees in their work, and giving constructive counsel concerning individual shortcomings.

Third, to refine and validate personnel techniques--to check qualification requirements, placement, examinations,

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[1]These headings are modifications of those set forth by O.G. Stahl, "Overhauling Federal Efficiency Ratings," Personnel Administration, September, 1943, p. 12.

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training, adjustment and progress.

Fourth, to objectify and justify the application of personnel policies--in selection for advancement, transfer, wage or salary increase, and other recognition of superior or inferior service.

Some of these basic objectives, and their modifications, are stressed more than others, which may or may not be completely ignored, by varying organizations depending on the ends to be achieved. For example, in industry a most important policy question in promotion is the relative significance of seniority and ability. Demands of unions for promotion by strict seniority can be met by management only by insisting that ability be considered the most important factor and then by demonstrating the fairness and objectivity of this policy by selecting for promotion those employees, who, on the basis of performance records and employee rating, are clearly superior to their fellow employees.[2] Here, the performance evaluation program would be developed with the main objective being the justification of a company promotion policy; a proven one that recognizes that ability and not seniority should determine promotion. Another objective stressed in this example could well be the periodic discussion with an individual of his ratings; if

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[2]Paul Pigors and C.A. Myers, Personnel Administration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 175.

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he is not selected for advancement, he will know why, and his will to work stands less chance of being destroyed by his thinking he was passed over in favor of another employee with more "pull". On the other hand, the objective of developing standards of satisfactory performance may be neglected entirely by industry in the face of a tight labor market.

In the Federal Civil Service, however, the emphasis is on the first two major objectives outlined above. The Hoover Commission has even urged that "ability and service records" should be used only for supervisor-employee conference, with a view to developing employee performance, and not to govern salary increases, layoffs, or dismissals.[3]

In the Navy today, it is the opinion of the writer (1) that the greatest emphasis is on performance evaluation that tends to objectify selection for further education or training, advancement, and transfer to billets requiring specific abilities, and (2) that the objective of improving individual performance is not sufficiently stressed. This will be discussed in following pages.

Thus the objectives of a program of evaluation may be altered and tailored to suit the needs of an organization,

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[3]Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of The Government, Personnel Management: A Report to the Congress, (Washington, 1949), p. 33.

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and the results desired must be determined prior to setting up a program if it is to be of value.

2. Techniques of Evaluating Performance

Any process of estimation involves the subjectiveness of the personality of the estimator, and the resulting evaluation becomes even less objective when another personality, that of the individual being judged, enters the picture. Thus, in order to discount the effect of this second personality, production records may be made the basis of performance evaluation in the case of work of a highly repetitive or routine nature. This method is often found in industry, and it is readily adapted to determination of wages, as in piecework payment systems. Even here it is only one basis of judging an employee, as personality factors are important in even routine jobs. In selection for promotion, for example, the best worker is not necessarily the best foreman material. Nevertheless, production is one basis of evaluation of individual performance, and one that tends toward greater objectivity. Its use is not seen as much in the Federal Civil Service as in industry. This is in part due to the failure to emphasize production in government service and in part to the fact that most governmental units deal in services.[4]

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> The guiding principle should be that objective measurements are superior in every way to judgments, and, therefore, that wherever the work lends itself to unit measurements it should be reorganized with that end in view.[5]

One method of measurement that is similar to the use of production records is the use of periodic tests. For example, a typing test given a stenographer could reflect proficiency. Production records, covering a longer period of time, would, however, give a more accurate evaluation of the employee.

Production records do not lend themselves as a basis of evaluating shipboard personnel. No job is sufficiently routine or repetitive, and the dual nature of naval service--(1) duties of specialty, and (2) general military duties that every individual in the Navy is required to perform--preclude this type of performance measurement. Therefore the problem resolves itself into one of devising a valid method of subjective estimation.

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Personnel Administration, (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 373.

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Since 1946, authority has been granted individual Federal agencies to make up special lists of elements for each class of jobs.[6] By making objective the elements incorporated in these rating forms, much can be done to make the reports meaningful. The abstractness of such things as leadership or courage or initiative makes judgments difficult and, further, makes it hard for judges to agree. Rating on ability to perform an important phase of a job may be more readily understandable than rating on an ambiguous trait.

> It is significant . . . that the Hoover Commission adds its voice to many others who have decried continuation of the present system. We have referred to current proposals to provide a simple report of "outstanding," "satisfactory," or "unsatisfactory" to meet the requirements of staff reductions and periodic pay increases within grade. Such a plan will be sterile, of course, unless some method of performance-item analysis, as now permitted under the Federal system, but without summary adjective ratings, can be used as the basis for supervisor-employee discussion and understanding--which is the primary objective and use of performance evaluation urged by the Hoover Commission.[7]

Making the report meaningful, however, does not constitute an end in itself; it should be made meaningful to the individual being evaluated as well as to the super-

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> It has been observed that two important uses of efficiency ratings are not facilitated by the Federal procedure:
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> 1. Employee development.--A very effective use of the merit rating in private employment is the periodic review between supervisor and subordinate of the weaknesses which the employee should seek to overcome. Such review is usually a highly personal, confidential relationship between the supervisor and the employee. In the Federal system higher reviews and appeals, together with penalty actions, militate against this use.
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> 2. Employee growth potential.--The Federal efficiency rating is an evaluation of performance during a past period. It does not attempt to evaluate employee growth or to project the potential growth of the employee toward higher positions in the organization.[8]

Plans that would act to modernize the Federal system include legislation recommended to the Congress by the U.S. Civil Service Commission

> pertaining to ratings which would: (1) abolish the uniform system; (2) permit each department to establish its own plan suited to its needs; (3) permit the dropping of "summary" ratings; (4) disengage ratings from personnel actions, such as salary increases, staff reductions, and the like; and (5) eliminate the cumbersome appeal machinery now prescribed for the rating system, substituting opportunity for "one impartial review" within the departments. Favorable action on these far-sighted recommendations will meet practically all the adverse criticism that has been leveled in recent years at the Federal system.[9]

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[8] Op. cit., p. 82.

[9] Mosher, Kingsley, and Stahl, op. cit., pp. 334-5.

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[3] Hoslar, Gingerly, and Ebert, op. cit., pp. 324-5.

[4] Op. cit., p. 88.

Additional techniques developed for the evaluation of performance include the older man-to-man rating scale, the graphic and linear scales, lists in which elements or statements pertinent to the individual being rated are checked and weighted, and other well-known schemes and their variations that will not be described herein. One more recent development, one that is the subject of considerable current study and trial, is the forced-choice format that is applied to rating scales as well as to self-report tests.

The forced-choice technique applied to rating scales requires the rater to judge between two equally favorable or unfavorable adjectives or statements which may or may not lie on a continuum. He is required to choose between conditions which may not really be alternatives, both of which may conceivably be inapplicable to his own experience.[10]

> No matter what halo or generosity effects enter the judge's thinking, such a question forces him to consider the subject in regard to the specific trait in question. After deciding whether Jones is more calm than cautious, more friendly than intelligent, more creative than painstaking, and so on, the judge has provided the best picture his knowledge permits of the characteristics of the subject.[11]

Even a psychologically sophisticated rater cannot

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[10] D.B. Stuitt, ed., Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 130.

[11] Lee J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 400.

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10D. E. Bartlett, ed., Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 132.

11Leo J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, (New York: Harper and Bros, 1949), p. 450.

often guess the most favorable answer, which is obtained by standardizing the item on well- and poor-performing subjects, and which must be kept secret by a scoring center. This technique, obviously, does not lend itself to the evaluation program where it is desired that the ratee know how he stands and be able to discuss his ability and progress with his superior.

3. Shipboard Evaluation of Personnel Performance

One distinguishing feature of administration of naval personnel is the distance between the operating units and the controlling activity centers. More specifically, if a factory manager or an agency head desires to obtain information about an individual, it is a relatively simple matter, in most cases, of contacting the man, his superiors, and/or his associates. But the Bureau of Naval Personnel, controlling vast numbers of servicemen all over the globe, must rely on written records and reports; if it is desired to select an officer for a billet that requires, say, experience in submarines and an ability to speak Turkish, such information is readily obtained from punched-card records. Such qualities, however, as exceptional leadership or tendencies to carelessness, have not been reduced to meaningful terms that may be entered on machine records. Such subjective qualities are obtained, in practice, by

such qualitative qualities are obtained, in practice, by so-called 'objective' measures which may be ordered on machine records. Such qualities, however, as conventional leadership or tenacious to convictions, have not been reduced easily or tenacious to convictions, have not been reduced to such information is readily obtained from purported-card

referring to the fitness report files of the individuals under consideration. Thus, where the record may not be confirmed by personal contact with an individual or one who knows him, the keeping of adequate records becomes of major importance.

The current Navy Officers Fitness Report requires the rater to consider each officer separately and to judge him as he is compared with other officers of the same rank and similar duties, keeping in mind the normal distribution. On each of 19 elements the individual officer is placed in the top 10%, the next 20%, the middle 40%, the next 20%, or the bottom 10%. The elements include five concerning sea or advance base duty, three concerning initiative and responsibility, three on understanding and skill, five on leadership, and three on conduct and habits of work. There are additional items dealing with the reporting officer's feeling about having the subject of the report under his command and about the officer's fitness for promotion. This report is completed by the rater without the aid of tests that could help him appraise people.

While the current form of the Navy Fitness Report wisely attempts to avoid misjudgment by reminding the rater of the real population rather than the ideal population and suggesting that he keep in mind the principle of normal distribution, it is common knowledge that analysis of Report

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files reveal a marked tendency toward a skewed distribution in the direction of high ability and performance. The desirability of this skewed distribution is debatable.

The problem of designing adequate report forms is one that receives continuing attention. One type tried by the Army involved the forced-choice format in an attempt to get greater objectivity in personality rating. While this technique has been dropped, at least for the present, it does represent an effort to increase the validity of officer fitness reports. While the forced-choice rating question or statement may be refined to the point that it actually measures what it is intended to measure, it has an inherent defect as far as this study of morale is concerned: it offers no opportunity for the rater to know <u>how</u> he is rating a subordinate. Aside from the fact that most raters dislike this feature, they are unable to confer with their subordinates regarding the qualities which the form measures.

One possible solution to this problem is to have two separate reports, one to be used for official purposes and another to be used for private evaluation of the rater with the ratee. Such a solution is held to be untenable as (1) the two reports could easily be at variance with each other, especially if the forced-choice format were used for official purposes, hence (2) the evaluation form used for personal conference would lose its significance or importance

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in the eyes both of the superior and the subordinate.

The findings of the Hoover Commission, referred to in the previous section, as well as the earlier discussion on essential requirements of good morale--among them "knowing where one stands"--substantiate the statement that any proposed system of personnel evaluation should not sacrifice the benefits to the subordinate of review of the report with the superior to the benefits of greater objectivity in reporting to a central agency. This statement implies that such review with the person being rated be made, and be made effectively. This will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

No ready solution to the problem can be made; the Navy Department is conducting extensive research programs to achieve an acceptable system of personnel evaluation. The needs of the naval service are different from those of other organizations, although much can be learned by study of methods used elsewhere. Of immediate importance to the shipboard rater is the objectivity and fairness with which existing forms are completed. It is further held that execution of rating forms can be an effective factor affecting morale: by wise interpretation of the assigned marks, the rater may direct a subordinate's performance into lines of self-improvement.

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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

> The Federal Government, as do most public and private organizations, still suffers from too many top administrators who know some subject-matter field or have a flair for public relations but have little notion of their personnel responsibilities (to say nothing of having little skill in the field) as heads of large aggregations of human personalities that are supposed to be working enthusiastically together in a common purpose.[1]

It is held that this "flair for public relations" occurs too rarely to neglect formal training in personnel practices, and that hit-or-miss trial-and-error methods of handling people are unsatisfactory. There is ample evidence that the large sums spent in personnel research, staff training, and personnel methods and services, by both private and public organizations, have been invested wisely.

Many benefits, measured in the ultimate increased economy and effectiveness with which an enterprise is conducted, could well be applied to naval activity. In time of mobilization, when manpower is a critical factor, such economy

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becomes a necessity. Therefore, the general, overall conclusion reached in this thesis is that the benefits derived from the study of scientific personnel management should be extended in the naval service by stressing training in personnel practices as well as in technical subjects at all levels of command.[2]

More specifically, it is concluded that the following major areas offer great opportunity for the responsible shipboard administrator to take positive and constructive steps toward increasing the morale of his organization. It is realized that at present the average serviceman is not qualified to operate effectively in all these areas. These conclusions may be thought of, therefore, as representing suggested points of attack in an effort to reduce waste of human effort by focussing attention and training on them and by recognizing them as significant factors affecting morale aboard ship.

1. Training in Morale Essentials

Since World War II, formal courses in naval leadership, including a background in psychology, have been introduced at officer training activities. Unfortunately, however, the

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majority of officers holding the rank of lieutenant or above have never been exposed to any scientific study of personnel management. These officers, generally, are those that have seen war-time service and are in more responsible positions exercising control over larger numbers of men.

That there is a great need for training of responsible superiors in personnel duties has been repeatedly pointed out by civilian and military students of the problem. That many military administrators are ignorant of basic psychological requirements that make possible a high morale is demonstrated by the conclusions of the Doolittle Board, the Bureau of Naval Personnel separatee studies, and the findings reported in The American Soldier series, among other research projects. Contrasting military with civilian administration of personnel tends to indicate the former is lagging the latter as regards the education of supervisors in psychological foundations.

Until such time as formal training in personnel management is extended to cover larger numbers of other than midshipmen and junior officers, the naval officer afloat could do much to improve the functioning of his organization. By conducting classes stressing not a study of maxims, proverbs, and how certain individuals achieved a measure of success in dealing with specific instances involving the handling of men, but by stressing psychology as applied to

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the military much could be done to describe human behavior and strike close to the reasons behind why people do what they do. By practice and example an officer may make the morale requirements discussed in Chapter IV meaningful to his subordinates in the chain of command; "knowledge of objectives" is a nice-sounding term that looks good on paper but, like the other factors affecting morale, is of little value unless placed into actual use. When one can actually see that there is something in such terms, that they are not so much academic day-dreaming, then he is more ready to accept them. The skilled administrator can first demonstrate his knowledge of personnel management in accordance with the best psychological principles, and next, having developed an interested acceptance of these practices, conduct more or less formal training of his subordinates in these areas.

An expanding and continuing program of this type, guided and aided by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, could spread knowledge of psychological fundamentals throughout the fleet far faster than a program aimed at institutional training of individuals ashore between changes in duty stations.

The outstanding contribution to the training of industrial supervisors during World War II by the War Manpower Commission is of interest in this connection. Through

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A program planned along comparable lines could be conducted aboard ship to the end that far more servicemen would have the benefit of a background of psychological morale requirements in their administration of personnel.

2. Shipboard Use of Attitude Surveys

There are many areas where use of attitude surveys is prohibited to the military administrator. Matters of operations and the like cannot be decided by rank and file opinion, obviously; tactical decisions (and the responsibility therefor) are assigned designated commanders trained in their area. However it is felt that there are places for the use of the attitude survey even though this technique has not been fully developed or perfected.

The first area in which it is concluded that the use of an opinion poll is justified is in the determination of matters and policies pertaining to the welfare and re-

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A second area, and one where the shipboard administrator may find his actions open to question, is the use of the attitude survey to determine matters of internal policy. In this connection, it can only be concluded that each situation must be considered on its own merit. If the responsible senior is well-read in the techniques he proposes to employ, and if he thinks a survey will provide the information he seeks, he may reasonably give it a try without fear of loss of "prestige" or lessening his prerogatives as the one responsible for the decision.

The area of greatest importance to this thesis is the use of the attitude survey to measure morale, not on the level of high command in Washington but on the spot, aboard ship. This has not been done to any extent, possibly due to lack of refinement of techniques as well as to other reasons mentioned previously. An interesting aspect of this problem is the research being conducted on the so-called "judgment tests". While ostensibly testing the judgment of petty officers, they actually are, by design, measuring

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morale.[4] Such a test, when refined, could be easily adapted to use aboard ship. While not especially straightforward, it appears to have merit.

The conclusion regarding the use of the attitude survey to measure morale aboard ship is simply this: The technique has been found of great value elsewhere, and the well-read administrator should not permit general service prejudice to prevent his giving it a chance to prove its possibilities.

3. Training in Interviewing

As discussed in Chapters VI and VII, the interview is a technique for communicating. By observing proven principles (which were not presented due to their being beyond the scope of this thesis), it was seen that communication can be greatly facilitated. In light of the need for better superior-subordinate relations mentioned several times herein, the obvious conclusion can be made that better rapport, communication of facts, ideas, or attitudes, can result from training of the administrator in the accepted methods of interviewing. Such training could well be done in a manner similar to (and possibly as a part of)

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4. Counseling aboard Ship

Unlike the training of large numbers of shipboard administrators in the fundamentals of military psychology and the techniques of interviewing, it cannot be concluded that counseling could be taught on an extensive scale.[5] Certainly the complicated non-directive methods could not be mastered (or practiced) by one who could not devote years to the subject. These statements do not preclude, however, study on the part of the interested administrator having a genuine desire to be of help to those asking or needing it. Unless a person had a real interest in the field of counseling, an interest strong enough to motivate him to self-study in the literature, it is doubtful whether he could be convinced in the time available aboard ship that such outmoded techniques as exhortation and giving advice are ineffective. The problem becomes one, in the opinion of the writer, of exposing shipboard administrators to the field of counseling and of attempting to develop interest in the work in individuals appearing to be suited for it. In this

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respect, classes conducted by trained medical service personnel could be arranged.

The study of counseling does not appeal to many as does the study of interviewing; it does not promise the rewards of personal gains. For this reason, study in the field will probably remain for the most part on an individual basis aboard ship.

It was shown in Chapter VII that display of authority is a major fault in the counseling situation. There remain many types of personal problems, however, which would require no such display on the part of a serviceman-counselor. Much help could be given aboard ship by individuals willing to devote the time needed to master a significant ability.

5. Personnel Evaluation

The problem of balancing the need for objective personal performance records with the need for performance forms that may be the basis of an interview with the person being rated was mentioned in the preceding chapter.

While the former need is unquestionably of great importance, for the purposes of this thesis the latter need is considered to have more immediate affect on the morale of shipboard personnel.

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discipline, among others. Without repeating these tenets, it is justifiable to state that going over a formal performance report with a superior is of great benefit to the one being rated. It further tends to keep the rater observant for the qualities or abilities that he knows will be rated.

That this review is infrequently conducted is well known to service personnel. Often a reluctance to discuss ratings is noted; a subordinate is shown his report, asked if he has any questions (he seldom has), and the episode is over. While the officer Fitness Report Form has provision for indicating if the ratee has seen the report or not, he is not required to be shown the content of the report unless it is unfavorable or unsatisfactory. The enlisted Quarterly Marks Card has no similar provision.

If objectivity in a rating form, such as could well be obtained by the use of the forced-choice format, is to be sacrificed to permit use of a form that may be made understandable to the person being rated, then it is reasonably concluded that steps should be taken to insure the report is actually reviewed in a meaningful manner by the rater in a private session with the ratee.

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